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“Argentina is nowadays, in reality, a protectorate of Chile and Brazil,” claimed in 2013 
Carlos Escudé, the most prominent IR scholar of Argentina, and added that the Argentinean Armed 
Forces are “mainly an organization devoted to meet salary obligations.”1 This current state of 
affairs is the consequence of a long decay process initiated in the aftermath of Malvinas War in 
1982: the elimination of compulsory military service, the dismantling of the arms industry, one of 
the lowest military expenditures in the Western hemisphere, and the volume of arms imports 
reduced almost to zero.2  
Some civilian authors are of the view that Argentinean Armed Forces should be completely 
dismantled for good and the money saved for better purposes.3 At the same time, South American 
politicians claim that the present and future of the region is about peaceful integration and interstate 
conflicts are a thing of the past. The public discourse only has place for transnational threats such 
as drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism, for which military role is minor (except in 
Colombia).4 Scholars who consider themselves specialists in defense have reacted accordingly and 
written about the absence of conflict hypothesis, as if Argentina had suddenly found itself in the 
best possible of worlds: total harmony, in spite of an ongoing dispute with United Kingdom about 
Malvinas and being surrounded by armed neighbors.5 
The purpose of this thesis is to elaborate on the warning of Escudé about Argentina’s status 
as a tacit protectorate and to offer an argument against the currently prevailing idea that, in any 
case, Argentina does no longer need to worry about defense or military forces. The argument 
concerns the potential rise of Brazil as a South American regional hegemon. 
                                                 
1 Carlos Escudé, “¿Somos un protectorado de Chile y Brasil?,” La Nación (Argentina) 24 Jan. 2013. 
2 Carlos Escudé, “Un experimento pacifista: las políticas exteriores y de seguridad de Argentina en el Siglo XXI,” 
Serie Documentos De Trabajo, Universidad del CEMA, 2010. 
3 Martín Caparrós, “¿Necesitamos un ejército?,” El País (Spain) 9 Feb. 2012; Fernando Iglesias, La Cuestión Malvinas: 
Crítica del Nacionalismo Argentino (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 2012). 
4 Juan Battaleme, “América del Sur: Conflicto y cooperación en la dinámica regional,” Ponencia presentada en el VII 
Congreso Nacional de Ciencia Política: Agendas Regionales en Escenarios de Conflicto, Universidad Católica de 
Córdoba, 17 Nov. 2005. 
5 Juan Battaleme, “¿Necesita Argentina una política de defensa?,” CARI: Grupo de Trabajo sobre la Inserción de 
Argentina en el Mundo, 16 Apr. 2014: 4, 6; Juan Battaleme, “La ausencia de hipótesis de conflicto y la trampa 
discursiva,” Revista UCEMA, Aug. 2010: 24-25.  
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The Federative Republic of Brazil is the world’s fifth largest country and the largest in 
South America by geographical area and population. Moreover, the economy of Brazil is the 
world’s ninth largest by nominal GDP.6 Brazil is a founding member of United Nations and 
member of the Group of 4 (G4) alongside Germany, India, and Japan, the advocates for a new 
permanent seat in the Security Council. The United Kingdom publicly supports new permanent 
seats but without veto rights. France supports the aspirations of G4, including veto rights.7 
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer introduces and develops offensive 
realism. This is a form of structural realism, meaning that the behavior of states are influenced 
mainly by the structure of the international system and not by their internal characteristics. This 
structure is ordered according to an anarchic principle. As a consequence, states are concerned 
mainly with their survival. Great powers seek to guarantee their survival by maximizing their share 
of world power and therefore by seeking hegemony, through diplomatic, economic and military 
means. However, there is a restriction: the stopping power of large bodies of waters constrain 
projection of land power, and as a consequence, great powers must satisfy with achieving regional 
and not global hegemony. A regional hegemon is a state that is so powerful that it dominates all 
the other states in the region. No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight 
against it.8  
Hegemony does not need to be manifested in a thrust towards expansion and military 
conquest, although that is always a possibility. It means that the hegemon is in a position to dictate 
rules of behavior to its neighbors.9 
If the premises of offensive realism are true, then Brazil, due to its enormous size and its 
growing material capabilities –population, natural resources endowments, potential for military 
power and economic output- is the most suitable candidate for making an attempt at regional 
hegemony in South America. 
                                                 
6 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” 20 Dec. 2015, <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1>. 
7  Lydia Swart, “Timeline of UN Security Reform,” Center for UN Reform, 12 Nov. 2015, 20 Dec. 2015, 
http://www.centerforunreform.org/?q=node/681. 
8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 
9 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Relations 3, 2010: 381-396. 
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At the moment, the United States is the only regional hegemon in the world. Offensive 
realism certainly expects the United States to be concerned about a challenge to its rule in the 
southern region of the Americas, as it was concerned with checking rising regional hegemons in 
the past (Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union), and as it is 
concerned nowadays with the rise of China in East Asia.   
However, I will argue that South American states should not rely blindly on the hope that 
the United States will eventually come to their aid. They would be wiser to consider the possibility 
of being on their own. This is particularly true for Argentina, second only to Brazil in terms of size 
and capabilities, and historically antagonist of the possibility of Brazilian regional hegemony.  
 
Research questions 
The research question of this thesis is: From the point of view of Argentinean decision-
makers, what are the options in order to check an eventual Brazilian attempt at regional hegemony? 
This question can be subdivided in the following questions: Firstly, should Argentina rely 
on extra regional balancing conducted by the United States? If the answer is in the negative, what 
are the chances of external balancing in South America, i.e. a coalition of South American states? 
Finally, if both extra regional and external balancing fail, Argentina will have to recur to internal 
balancing. In that case, the question is: What will be the challenges and choices of Argentinean 
decision makers in terms of internal balancing? 
 
Justification and relevance 
 The relevance of the thesis is given by its implications for Argentinean defense policy. In 
terms of Stephen Van Evera, this is a policy-evaluative or policy-prescriptive thesis, for it 
evaluates current or future public policies, and tries to discern the effects of these policies by means 
of forecasts. These forecasts rest in turn on implicit or explicit theoretical assumptions.10  
                                                 




In this case, offensive realism might provide a possible future scenario in which Argentina 
will have no choice but to rely on its own resources, i.e. internal balancing, in order not to be at 
the mercy of the implications of Brazilian hegemony. As a consequence, Argentina should 
reevaluate its current policy of keeping the military forces in a condition such that they are no 
longer credible deterrents, leaving thus the country practically defenseless in the event of an armed 
conflict. 
 
Methodology and method 
 The research methodology for this thesis will be scenario analysis. Scenarios can be 
understood as counterfactuals about the future. Political scientists almost exclusively focus on 
historical counterfactuals. However, future counterfactuals exist, and they are an effective way for 
students to apply theory to policy. In order to do this, the researcher with a theory in mind will 
deduce from it the logical future in a narrative that connects theoretical expectations with observed 
signals.11  
I will deduce from offensive realism driving forces in regard to the international level 
environment (i.e. the distribution of power and relative material capabilities) and their most likely 
evolution in the coming years; next, I will identify highly probable contextual conditions and 
critical uncertainties. This will allow me to write the scenario. 
The research method is thus deductive and combines qualitative and quantitative elements. 
The key assumption is that the premises of offensive realism constitute an appropriate theoretical 
framework to analyze the international environment and extract implications. If offensive realism 
would prove a fundamentally misguided theory, all that follows would be superfluous too. But for 
the purposes of this thesis, which is an exercise in application of a theory to policy, I will assume 
that offensive realism is essentially “correct.” 
                                                 
11 Timothy J. Junio and Thomas G. Mahnken, “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for 
International Relations,” International Studies Review, no. 15, 2013: 374-395; see also Dong-Ho Han, “Scenario 
Constructions and Its Implications for International Relations Research,” The Korean Journal of International Studies 
9 no. 1, 2011: 39-65; Michael F. Oppenheimer, “From Prediction to Recognition: Using Alternate Scenarios to 
Improve Foreign Policy Decisions,” SAIS Review 32, no. 1, winter-spring 2012: 19-31. 
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I will basically evaluate with the premises of offensive realism: 1) what requirements Brazil 
is accomplishing in terms of distribution of power and material capabilities in the region; 2) the 
role of the United States as an offshore balancer; 3) whether South American states are more likely 
to have incentives to join together and balance, or to either bandwagon or buck-pass.  
However, even if offensive realism provides a good guidance for aggregate patterns of state 
behavior in a regional system, it is not so accurate when it comes to the specific daily behavior of 
a particular state. For this reason, when it comes to the challenges and choices of Argentina in 
terms of internal balancing, I will recur also to neoclassical realism. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 As it follows from the previous sections, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is the theory 
upon which the scenario will be based. The idea that great powers seek to maximize their share of 
world power and therefore aim at regional hegemony is the key assumption underlying the future 
scenario for South America. Offensive realism will also have a lot to say about the role of the 
United States and the prospects of a South American inter-state coalition to check Brazilian rise.  
Geopolitical thought, i.e. the study of the interrelations between geography and politics, 
will also play a significant role. Offensive realism has a place for geopolitics when it comes to the 
importance of relative distance or position, and buffer zones. In the case of South America, there 
are two elements to be taken into consideration: 1) the relative position or distance of South 
American states with respect to the potential hegemon, 2) the significance of the Amazonia as 
buffer zone in terms for incentives for balancing. 
Finally, when it comes to the question of internal balancing, offensive realism falls short 
of a meaningful contribution. Neoclassical realism, in particular the works of Randall Schweller 
and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro,12 will offer a model for intervening state level variables. These will help 
to address the challenges and choices of Argentina.  
                                                 
12  Randall Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International 
Security 29, no. 2, 2004: 159-201; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and 
the Resource-Extractive State,” Security Studies 15, no. 3, 2006: 464-495. See also Steven E. Lobell, et al., eds., 
Neoclassical realism, the state and foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2009); Gideon Rose, 




Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1, “Offensive realism for South America,” proceeds in three steps. I introduce first 
the original Waltzian defensive realism, and then Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. The idea is to 
highlight the differences between the two in terms of expectations and policy prescriptions. I will 
mention important concepts in offensive realism such as the difference between military and latent 
power, and how to measure it. Finally, I argue why offensive realism is suitable for South America.  
 Chapter 2, “Methodology and method,” defines the scenario methodology as a future 
counterfactual narrative relying on the premises of offensive realism, and introduces the guidelines 
I will use for plotting the scenario of this thesis, with concepts such as driving forces, contextual 
conditions and critical uncertainties. I also provide examples of previous scenarios in International 
Relations and geopolitics. I present then the possible scenarios that I consider for South America. 
Chapter 3, “South America and the rise of Brazil,” is very extensive. I explain first why I 
refer to a South American regional system, and not to Latin America, and I define its limits. I 
analyze relative material capabilities and distribution of power, to understand next why Brazil is a 
potential candidate for regional hegemony, and what the meaning of hegemony is in this context. 
Finally, I comment on some limitations to this scenario approach based on offensive realism. 
Chapter 4, “The United States as an offshore balancer,” addresses one critical uncertainty 
of my scenario analysis. The chapter first introduces the theory of offshore balancing, which 
predicts that the United States will want to check any challenge to its rule over the southern part 
of the Americas. The very counterfactual nature of scenario comes to the front here, because the 
question is “What if?” What if the United States finds itself in a situation in which it cannot react 
properly? The second section is then about windows of opportunity for Brazil. The third section is 
about implications of offshore balancing for third states involved, something which offensive 
realism overlooks, because it is mostly concerned about great powers.  
Chapter 5, “Geopolitics of South America and external balancing,” begins by explaining 
the contribution of geopolitical variables to the analysis of international politics. Offensive realism, 
in particular, makes use of relative position or distance, and the meaning of buffer zones in the 
form of large bodies of water, the territory of other states, mountain ranges, etc. There is a 
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description of South American regional system, from the point of view of physical and human 
geography, and the implications regarding patterns of conflict and cooperation, meant as an 
example of applied geopolitical thought. Lastly, with a combination of the two geographical 
variables aforementioned plus a third variable from structural realism (relative power), I evaluate 
the incentives of South American states to present a balancing coalition against a rising Brazil.  
Chapter 6, “Neoclassical realism and Argentinean internal balancing,” elaborates first on 
the idea that neorealism and neoclassical realism are not competitors but complementary 
approaches that seek to explain different phenomena. Then, I proceed to define the state as the 
national security executive, and to identify what other domestic actors need to be considered. I 
present Schweller’s theory of “under-balancing” and Taliaferro’s theory of state power and how it 
relates to choices of strategy for internal balancing. 
Chapter 7, “Wild card: nuclear weapons,” is very brief and discusses the possibility that 
the region ceases to be a nuclear weapon free zone; this implies the abandonment of the Treaty of 
Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco by either Brazil or Argentina, and what would be 
the implications for an offensive realist scenario. 
Finally, the concluding chapter provides an answer to the research questions, elaborates on 





1. Offensive realism for South America 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on two bodies of international relations 
theory within the realist school of thought. The first one is offensive realism. Offensive realism is 
a theory proposed fundamentally by Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 
Offensive realism distinguishes itself from a first formulation of so-called neorealism (or structural 
realism)13 by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics,14 which is labelled defensive 
realism. The second one is neoclassical realism, and I will discuss it in chapter 6.  
The divide within neorealism between offensive realism and defensive realism represents 
a theoretical competition because they fundamentally diverge on the implications of anarchy: 
whereas defensive realism holds that anarchy provides strong incentives for restraint, offensive 
realism holds the opposite. The two theories generate thus different predictions and policy 
prescriptions.15 
 This chapter proceeds as follows: the first section introduces the most important aspects of 
Waltz’s formulation of defensive realism. Next, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is explained, 
compared and contrasted with defensive realism. At the end of the chapter, I make the case for the 
suitability of offensive realism for South American states system.  
 
1.1 Defensive realism 
 Before the emergence of neorealism, classical realism had argued that states are led by 
human beings who have a will to power. This inherent will to power is the principal driving force 
pushing each state to strive for supremacy. International anarchy is a second-order cause of state 
behavior. Contrarily, neorealism does not assume that states are inherently aggressive because they 
are infused with a will to power. It is the structure of the international system that forces great 
powers to pay careful attention to the balance of power.16 
                                                 
13 Neorealism and structural realism are used as synonyms.  
14 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
15 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, 
no. 3, 2000-2001: 134. 
16 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 19.  
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 According to Waltz, the international system is thus composed of a structure and of 
interacting units.17 Structures are defined or arranged according to three elements: 1) the principle 
by which a system is ordered, 2) the specification of functions of formally differentiated units and 
3) the distribution of capabilities across those units.18  
For example, domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic where the units are 
differentiated by the function they perform and stand in relations of super- and subordination. The 
international system instead is ordered according to the principle of anarchy and it is composed of 
like units in relation of coordination, where each one is the equal of all the others, none is entitled 
to command, and none is required to obey.19 
The units are not differentiated by their function but by their capabilities. In fact, although 
states are like units functionally, they differ vastly in their capabilities. The distribution of 
capabilities is not an attribute of the units but of the system. Hence, the structure of an international 
system changes with changes in the distribution of capabilities.20  
An anarchic international system is a self-help environment. Those units that fail to help 
themselves, or do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper.21 Scholars that advocate a 
structural view of international politics would more or less agree with Waltz up to this point. The 
disagreement begins when Waltz develops further implications of international anarchy. 
According to Waltz, the goal that the anarchic international system encourages states to 
seek is security. Whereas in classical realism power was the goal, power is here a means to an end. 
Increased power may or may not help reach security. States can seldom afford to make maximizing 
power their goal. Moreover, maximizing power can prove a self-defeating strategy. The system 
induces the recurrence of balance of power. The first concern of states is not to maximize power 
but to maintain their positions in the system.22  
In this way, Waltz and the defensive realists like him argue that states may limit their 
pursuit of power to maximize their security. Sustained hegemonies rarely if ever rise in multistate 
                                                 
17 Waltz, Theory, 79. 
18 Waltz, Theory, 82, 88, 100-101. 
19 Waltz, Theory, 88, 93, 97. 
20 Waltz, Theory, 97, 105. 
21 Waltz, Theory, 105-106, 118. 
22 Waltz, Theory, 119, 125-127. 
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systems, because a balancing coalition will form against any state that threatens to gain a position 
of hegemony.23 
In defensive realism, balance checkmates offenses and great powers must be careful not to 
acquire too much power, because excessive strength may trigger a coalition against them.24 
Defensive realism suggests that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as the best 
route to security. Only under certain circumstances defensive realism expects states to pursue 
expansionist strategies as a means to achieve security.25 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned, critics of defensive realism (such as Fareed Zakaria 
and Randall Schweller) charge that defensive realism cannot explain state expansion because there 
are never international incentives for such behavior.26 Moreover, according to Mearsheimer, Waltz 
has no place in his theory for profound or deep causes of war. Waltz does not seem to conceive 
any important benefits to be gained from war. In fact, wars are largely the result of uncertainty and 
miscalculations.27 
 
1.2 Offensive realism 
 Offensive realism is not only a descriptive theory that explains how great powers have 
behaved in the past and how they are likely to behave in the future. It is at the same time a 
prescriptive theory. States should behave according to the dictates of offensive realism.28 
 As a strand of neorealism, offensive realism also assumes that the international system 
strongly shapes the behavior of states, which are the principal actors in world politics. Like its 
defensive counterpart, it pays little attention to individuals or domestic political considerations 
such as ideology, and it tends to treat states like black boxes or billiard balls. The behavior of states 
is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. Also like 
defensive realism, it assumes that anarchy is the ordering principle of international system, i.e. the 
                                                 
23 Jack S. Levy, “What Do Great Powers Balance Against and When?” Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 
21st Century, ed. T.V Paul, James Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 32, 35.   
24 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 20. 
25 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 129, 152. 
26 Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy,” 129-130. 
27 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 20. 
28 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 11-12. 
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system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them. Therefore, survival 
is the primary goal of great powers.29 
 However, offensive realism has three other assumptions about the international system: 1) 
states inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to 
hurt and possibly destroy each other; 2) states can never be certain about other states’ intentions, 
and 3) great powers are rational actors, aware of their external environment, who think strategically 
about how to survive in it.30 
 The absence of a central authority that can protect states from each other, combined with 
the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and the uncertainty about other 
states’ intentions, results in three general patterns of behavior: fear, out of suspicion and 
anticipation of danger; self-help, out of a sense of vulnerability and loneliness, and power 
maximization. Self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances, but these are only 
temporary marriages of convenience. States always operate according to their own self-interest. In 
other words, the assumptions about the international system create powerful incentives for great 
powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other.31 
 In defensive realism, states often show restraint in their quest for power in order not to 
provoke a coalition against them that would ultimately defeat them and leave them worse than 
before. Offensive realism makes the opposite conclusion. 
 States employ a variety of means –economic, diplomatic, and military- to shift the balance 
of power in their favor, even if doing so makes other states suspicious or even hostile. States pay 
close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize 
their share of world power, which is their overriding goal. Moreover, their ultimate aim is to be 
the hegemon: a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. The 
pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved. Only a misguided state would pass up an 
opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to 
survive. As a consequence, there are no status quo powers in the international system. Great powers 
                                                 
29 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 10-11, 17, 30. 
30 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 30-31. 
31 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 32-33. 
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almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if 
they think it can be done at a reasonable price.32  
 “At a reasonable price” means that states are not mindless aggressors that engage in losing 
wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On the contrary, before great powers take offensive actions, they 
think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. 
Nevertheless, great powers miscalculate from time to time because they make decisions based on 
imperfect information.33 Moreover, great powers cannot always act on their offensive intentions, 
because behavior is influenced not only by what states want, but also by their capacity to realize 
these desires. Great powers facing powerful opponents will be less inclined to consider offensive 
action.34 
 However, the biggest limitation that makes it virtually impossible for any state to achieve 
global hegemony is the stopping power of water. The difficulty of projecting power across the 
world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power is the principal impediment to world 
domination. Water is not a serious obstacle for a navy that is transporting ground forces across an 
ocean and landing them into a friendly state, but when a navy attempts to deliver an army onto 
territory controlled and well-defended by a rival great power, water is a forbidding barrier. Navies 
are therefore at a significant disadvantage when attempting amphibious operations against 
powerful land-based forces. Armies that have to traverse a large body of water to attack a well-
armed opponent invariably have little offensive capability, also because there are significant limits 
on the number of troops and the amount of firepower that a navy can bring.35  
The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today, but it does 
not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia, and it has no intention of trying to conquer and control 
those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water. Historically, the stopping 
power of water explains in good part why the United Kingdom and the United States (since 
becoming a great power in 1898) have never been invaded by another great power, or why the 
United Kingdom has not tried to conquer territory in the European continent.36  
                                                 
32 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 2, 29, 34. 
33 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 37-38, 40. 
34 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 37. 
35 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 41, 114.  
36 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 41, 44. 
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In sum, there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime 
soon. In this context, the best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon37 
and possibly control another region that is nearby and accessible over land. The presence of oceans 
on much of the earth’s surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. It is 
however possible to apply the concept of hegemony, as domination of a system, to a system that 
is not the entire world but a particular region. Thus, one can distinguish between global hegemons, 
which dominate the world, but which have never existed, and regional hegemons, which dominate 
distinct geographical areas. According to Mearsheimer, the United States has been a regional 
hegemon in the Western Hemisphere for at least the past one hundred years.38 
 So great powers strive for hegemony in their region of the world. The best way to ensure 
their survival is to be the most powerful state in their region. The stronger a state is relative to its 
potential rivals, the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival.39 
Now, a very important consideration is that the level of fear between states varies not with 
assessments about each other’s intentions, but with changes in the distribution of power. Intentions 
are ultimately unknowable, so states worried about their survival must make worst-case 
assumptions about their rivals’ intentions. Great powers balance against material capabilities, not 
intentions.40 Material capabilities are the basis of power. 
States have two kinds of power: military power and latent power. Military power is based 
largely on the size and strength of a state’s army and its supporting air and naval forces. Even with 
nuclear weapons, armies are the core ingredient of military power. Independent naval forces and 
strategic air forces are not suited for conquering territory. Mearsheimer provides then a model for 
measuring military power. 1) Relative size and quality of army: number of soldiers, quality of 
soldiers, number of weapons, quality of weaponry, and how those soldiers and weapons are 
organized for war; 2) Supporting (not independent) air forces: inventory of aircraft, available 
numbers and quality, pilot efficiency, ground-based air defense systems, reconnaissance 
                                                 
37 Cursives are mine. 
38 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 40, 44, 83-84. 
39 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 33. 
40 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 45.  
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capabilities and battle-management systems; 3) power-projection capabilities: whether large 
bodies of water limit an army’s offensive capability.41 
Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power; 
it is largely based on a state’s overall size of its population and its wealth. Population size matters 
a lot because great powers require big armies and these can be raised only in countries with large 
populations. For Mearsheimer, states with small populations cannot be great powers. Wealth is 
important because money, technology and personnel is needed to build military forces and to fight 
wars. A state cannot build a powerful military if it does not have the money and technology to 
equip, train, and continually modernize its fighting forces. It is also important to have industries 
producing the newest and most sophisticated technologies oriented to the most advanced 
weaponry.42  
The next step is to define a good indicator of mobilizable wealth, i.e. the resources a state 
has at its disposal to build military forces. In order to economize words, wealth here includes also 
the size of population. Mearsheimer starts with gross national product (GNP) as the most 
commonly used indicator of a state’s wealth. GNP is not always a good indicator of latent power. 
It does not always capture mobilizable wealth and technological sophistication of different states. 
It is possible for two states to have similar GNPs but substantially different population sizes and 
markedly different levels of industrialization. GNP, he concludes, does a reasonably good job but 
sometimes is not a sound measure of latent power. Consequently, one can either find an alternative 
indicator that does a better job, or use GNP but add the appropriate qualifiers.43 
In this thesis I will take the second approach. To GNP I will add some indicators of National 
Material Capabilities as defined by the Correlates of War Project: total population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure; I will also consider 
percentage of population below poverty line.44  
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To sum up, states are power maximizers. They care about relative power, not absolute 
power. States that maximize relative power are concerned primarily with the distribution of 
material capabilities and they try to gain as large a power advantage as possible over potential 
rivals, because power is the best means to survival in a dangerous world.  
They do this by four mechanisms: firstly, they try to dominate the balance of land power, 
because that is the best way to maximize their share of military might. Military power is based 
largely on the size and strength of a state’s army and its supporting air and naval forces, but in any 
case, wars are won mainly on the ground. Secondly, states care greatly about latent power, because 
abundant wealth and a large population are prerequisites for building military forces. Therefore, 
states aim to maximize the amount of the world’s wealth that they control. States care about 
relative wealth, because economic might is the foundation of military might. Thirdly, they aim at 
nuclear superiority over their rivals, although this is a very difficult objective. Lastly, they aim at 
regional hegemony. The key moment for that comes when there is a critical power gap between 
the potential hegemon and the second most powerful state in the system. To qualify as a potential 
hegemon, a state must have –by some reasonably large margin- the most formidable army as well 
as the most latent power among all the states located in its region.45 
 
1.3 Why offensive realism 
 In this section I justify my choice of offensive realism for this thesis.  
The first element to be considered is the following: the core notion of defensive realism is 
that a balance of power, defined as a multipolar or bipolar distribution of capabilities, is the normal, 
ubiquitous state of all international systems. Unipolar or hegemonic systems do not form in 
multistate systems because perceived threats of hegemony over the system generate balancing 
behavior by other leading states in the system. Even if they do form, they will be inherently 
unstable, as balancing processes push the system back to bi-or multipolarity.46 
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If such is the logic of the international system, then states would have little incentive to 
pursue expansionist policies. However, Wohlforth, Kaufman and Little find that the defensive 
realist assertion about the universality of balance throughout different eras and regions has no 
support. Balanced and unbalanced distributions of power seem roughly equally common. Balances 
frequently form, but they always break down, sometimes into fragmented or nonpolar systems, but 
more often into unipolar or hegemonic systems, the longevity of which is widely variable.47 
 This first consideration notwithstanding, it is worthwhile to analyze the specific predictions 
each approach proposes when it comes to external balancing. When a single state or coalition of 
states gains preponderance and weaker states feel they could lose their security or even cease to 
exist, they can flock together to form balancing coalitions. This is called external balancing. 
Threatened states could also adopt an internal balancing strategy (which will be considered later). 
The point to be made now is that even theorists that emphasize balance-of-power outcomes 
acknowledge that not every state can afford external balancing at any time. Sometimes they have 
incentives to buck-pass or bandwagon. Buck-pass is to let someone else do the balancing. 
Bandwagon means alignment with the source of danger. 
My reasoning is that when one considers the specific arguments for balance, buck-pass or 
bandwagon, the distinction between offensive and defensive realism is not so meaningful, and 
rather irrelevant when it comes to the analysis of South American states system. This is because 
at the moment of analyzing a particular region, geopolitical elements necessarily come to the fore. 
Geopolitics in this context refers in broad terms to the effects of geography on international politics. 
Specifically, one could ask for the effects, if any, of relative positions of the states involved, the 
presence of buffer zones, and relative power. 
The first element, then, has to do with relative position or relative distance. States nearer 
the threat are more likely to engage in balancing than are more distant states.48 This is very intuitive 
and not dependent on whether one takes a more defensive or aggressive stance as regards the 
consequences of anarchy. Because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that 
are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. Other things being equal, therefore, 
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states are more likely to make their alliance choices in response to nearby powers than in response 
to those that are distant.49  
Mearsheimer agrees:  
“Great powers that share a border with an aggressor are likely to feel particularly 
vulnerable to attack, and thus they are likely to take matters into their own hands 
and balance… on the other hand, threatened states separated from an aggressor 
by a barrier are likely to feel less vulnerable to invasion and therefore more 
inclined to pass the buck to an endangered state that has a common border with 
the menacing state. Thus, among threatened states, those that live next door to 
the aggressor usually get stuck with the buck, while those more distant from the 
threat usually get to pass the buck. There is some truth to the dictum that 
geography is destiny”.50  
So it is important to observe whether the threatened state shares a border with the aggressor. 
But not any border, because if there is a geographical barrier, such as a large body of water, the 
effect would be the same.51 In sum, if a threatened state is separated from its adversary by the 
territory of another state, a large body of water or a territorial buffer zone, then it is more likely to 
pass the buck.  
A second element is the distribution of capabilities. More powerful states are more likely 
to engage in balancing than are weaker states.52 Weak states bordering a potential hegemon may 
be so vulnerable that they choose to bandwagon rather than balance, especially if a powerful 
neighbor has demonstrated its ability to compel obedience.53  
Mearsheimer considers that threatened states usually prefer buck-passing to balancing, 
because the buck-passer avoids the costs of fighting the aggressor in the event of war.54 Logically, 
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weaker states would rather pass the buck than balance. But Mearsheimer goes even further and 
claims that the strategy for the weak is bandwagoning:  
“If a state is badly outgunned by a rival, it makes no sense to resist its demands, 
because that adversary will take what it wants by force anyway and inflict 
considerable punishment in the process. Bandwagoning is employed mainly by 
minor powers that stand alone against hostile great powers. They have no choice 
but to give in to the enemy, because they are weak and isolated.”55  
In any case, the conclusion is that when a state is weak, the probability of balancing is 
inversely proportional to distance. It can either pass the buck, or bandwagon, but it is less likely to 
engage in balancing. Once more, one does not have to subscribe to offensive realism to concede 
the plausibility of this argument. No matter how strong the general incentive for balancing may be, 
weak states can only do so much. Table 1 sums up the previous arguments. 
 Less distant More distant 
Weak states Less likely to balance (rather pass the 
buck or even bandwagon) 
Less likely to balance (rather pass the 
buck) 
Strong states More likely to balance More likely to pass the buck 
Table 1. Balancing, distance and power 
 
My point is that when one studies a specific regional system, it is not so meaningful to 
inquire into general patterns of balance-of-power or hegemony throughout history. Instead, one 
can look for the specific predictions for balancing in relation to relative geographical proximity, 
buffer zones, and distribution of capabilities and then apply it to that regional system, in order to 
determine whether balancing is more likely to occur or not. If it turns out that balancing is relatively 
less likely to occur, then one could conclude that a potential hegemon would face smaller costs in 
its attempt to change the system. In other words, it would have more incentives to expand.  
An environment where a regional potential hegemon has more incentives to expand than 
to restrain itself is an environment for offensive realism. Defensive realist considerations do not 
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help much, because even defensive realism concedes that relatively more distant states or states 
isolated from the aggressor would rather not balance, and relatively smaller states closer to the 
aggressor would rather not balance as well. In chapter 5 I will argue that this is precisely the case 
of South America. 
For the sake of argument, let us now compare the merits of offensive realism against a non-
realist approach such as democratic peace theory.56 I do not even need to disprove democratic 
peace theory to make my point. Much on the contrary, let us assume that there is some degree of 
truth in democratic peace theory, even in its restricted form, i.e. democracies do not wage war 
against each other.  
Most of South American countries, for example, have experienced a wave of 
democratization in the 1980s, which has more or less endured until present day. Are we to conclude 
that their ministries of defense should simply be dismantled by merits of democratic peace theory? 
Are we to assume we entered into some sort of “post-realist” era where intentions can be assumed 
peaceful?  
Even in that case, it would only take a military coup d’état and the establishment of a new 
autocracy in one or more of those states to go back to the previous realist era of uncertainty and 
security dilemma. In other words, even if democratic peace theory was correct in an “explanatory” 
sense, it is hardly a reliable guideline for foreign policy, because nobody can assure that a military 
coup d’état is completely off the question. 
In this chapter I have tried to justify the choice of offensive realism as a tool for studying 
broad patterns of international politics in South American system. The next chapter is a 
methodological one, where I explain how the premises of offensive realism are utilized to project 
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2. Methodology and method 
 
This chapter has three sections. In the first section I define the scenario methodology as a 
future counterfactual narrative and introduce the concepts of driving forces, contextual conditions 
and critical uncertainties. In the second section I provide some examples of scenarios in IR and 
geopolitics literature. Finally, I present the possible future scenarios for South America that will 
be the subject of following chapters. 
 
2.1. Preparing scenario analysis 
 This thesis uses scenario analysis for its methodology. There are many ways to approach 
the concept of scenario. For instance, Herman Kahn describes scenarios as “attempts to describe 
in some detail a hypothetical sequence of events that could lead plausibly to the situation 
envisaged.” Peter Schwartz defines scenarios as “stories about the way the world might turn out 
tomorrow, stories that can help us recognize and adapt to changing aspects of our present 
environment”.57 Dong-Ho Han refers to the scenario-building methodology as a means by which 
people can articulate different futures with trends, uncertainties, and rules over a certain amount 
of time. In this way, scenario thinking enables decision makers to make an important decision at 
the present time.58  
Gaub and Laban observe that scenarios are not only a description of possible future 
situations but also of the pathways leading there, and that insofar they come with an explanation 
of how the projected future came about, they reduce speculation.59 Finally, Oppenheimer considers 
that alternate scenarios present plausible and distinctive futures that, among other things, improve 
early recognition of emerging trends and can serve as alternate platforms for evaluating the 
sustainability of current policies.60 
It is important however to bear in mind that scenarios are not predictions. Gaub and Laban 
warn that “future studies can never claim to accurately predict a certain future.”61 Oppenheimer 
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not only concurs, but adds that “quite the contrary, scenarios are intended to deconstruct 
predictions that force-fit analysis to preferences or other forms of bias.”62  
On their part, Junio and Mahnken answer to critics who suggest that scenarios constitute 
mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future. Scenarios assist scholars with developing 
testable hypothesis, gathering data, identifying a theory’s upper and lower bounds, articulating 
“world views,” setting new research agendas, and avoiding cognitive biases. Scenarios are also an 
effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy.63  
 For the purposes of this thesis, I will follow the guidelines of Junio and Mahnken in their 
article Conceiving of Future War…. Drawing on business literature, counterfactual methods work, 
and their own experiences, the authors offer “best practices for scenarios dedicated to the core 
interests of political scientists: developing and improving upon theory.”64  
Junio and Mahnken consider that scenarios are “counterfactual narratives about the future.” 
Moreover, scenarios “may be understood and applied through the existing and widely published 
framework of counterfactuals. Political scientists almost exclusively focus on historical 
counterfactuals, but future counterfactuals exist.” According to the authors, a historical 
counterfactual exists in the same logical space as a future counterfactual, and much of the 
background context for historical counterfactuals “may be reasonable assumed to be stable in the 
future.”65 
 Junio and Mahnken describe six types of future counterfactuals: 1) narratives regarding 
future warfare; 2) political narratives, such as those regarding foreign policy or domestic politics 
in a country of foreign policy interest; 3) analysis of how scenarios were used in historical decision 
making; 4) theory extension, or the use of scenarios to demonstrate how a casual process could 
unfold; 5) theory development, or the use of scenarios to identify and understand specific causal 
relationships; 6) scenarios are sometimes developed using large data sets for quantitative 
projections of political trends. On this last type, Junio and Mahnken comment that researchers 
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extrapolate historical and contemporary numerical data to create visions of the future and then 
assess the political implications of living in that kind of world.66 
 Next, Junio and Mahnken offer a step-by-step guideline for the construction of scenarios, 
based on the following concepts: “types of scenario,” “driving forces,” “contextual conditions,” 
“critical uncertainties” and “plot lines.” 
 “Types of scenario:” In the absence of theory, an obvious use of scenarios is to develop, 
or at least to better understand the most important questions to ask. Conversely, in order to deduce 
the logical future from a current theory already in mind, one should look after a narrative that 
connects theoretical expectations with observed signals to project a future, for example, five years 
hence, or so.67  
 “Driving forces,” to be deduced from the theory of interest. These “drivers” are the 
independent and intervening variables of interest to the researcher. They should be variables 
capable of taking on qualitative or quantitative measures.68 
Highly probable “contextual conditions” for the future narrative: assumptions and data 
(both qualitative and quantitative) that are of interest for the scenario, but are not key drivers. 
According to the authors, the explicit identification of contextual conditions usually does not 
include stating parts of the world that are extremely unlikely to change, such as the existence of 
the United States, but may well include assigning a value to something like the US force 
disposition in the world.69 
 “Critical uncertainties” are low-probability, high impact outcomes that may follow from 
the theory, independent variables and context. These outcomes should be logically deduced from 
the theory and would have dramatic effects on the value of the dependent variable of interest, and 
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would be plausible. The idea is to avoid surprise by anticipating theoretically consistent low-
probability outcomes.70  
“Plot lines” which develop the central logic of a scenario, and connect the drivers and 
theoretical expectations of causation.71 
Once all this is ready, the next step is to write the scenario, which should be explicit in its 
identification of all the elements aforementioned.  
 
2.2 Comparing scenarios 
In this section I present some previous applications of the scenario analysis methodology 
to which I have paid attention in order to build my own scenario for this thesis. Some of these are 
explicit scenario building, some others are not.  
For example, the Center for Global Affairs has published a series of scenario workgroups 
on Iraq, Iran, China, Turkey, Russia and Ukraine. The Russia Scenarios workshop, to mention one, 
offers three scenarios for Russia in 2020: “Working Authoritarianism,” “Bottom-up liberalization 
and modernization,” and “Degeneration.” Some drivers common to the three scenarios are 
identified: domestic politics, global economic trends, and diversification and economic reform. 
Others are specific of each scenario, such as ethnic conflict in the third one.72 
On their part, Gaub and Laban present in Arab futures… three potential futures for the Arab 
world in 2025. The report takes into account projections based to the maximum extent possible on 
available data. It identifies larger trends so-called “megatrends,” i.e. relative certainties which are 
not likely to change, be countered or turned around over the next decade and define the “possibility 
space of the future.” These projected megatrends are demographic growth, urbanization, climate 
change and reliance on hydrocarbon sector, vulnerability to food prices, increase in literacy rates 
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and internet penetration, and a slow progress in gender equality. It defines “game-changers” as 
those areas where policy-makers will influence the course of events by their choices. These are 
youth unemployment, dependence on volatile food prices, insecurity, democratic change and 
inclusiveness. Lastly, it considers “wild cards,” i.e. events with a high impact but a low probability, 
which as a result contain a strong element of strategic surprise: chemical weapons in the hands of 
a non-state actor, the fall of the House of Saud, a war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, an energy 
technology revolution, etc. Wild cards are sometimes known also as “Black Swan events.” The 
three potential futures are labelled “Arab Simmer,” “Arab Implosion,” and “Arab Leap.” The first 
is considered the most plausible, the second is the most plausible worst-case scenario and the third 
is the most optimistic.73  
In the terminology of Gaub and Laban, “megatrends” are analogous to “driving forces” 
and “game-changers” to “critical uncertainties.” To understand this comparison, I find useful to 
think about it this way: the “driving forces” are the known predetermined elements, whereas 
“critical uncertainties” can be conceived as the locus of the question “What if?” that opens the way 
for counterfactuals.  
Consider the following example: Mearsheimer’s article “Why the Soviets Can’t Win 
Quickly in Central Europe.” This is a case of narrative regarding future warfare: Mearsheimer’s 
aim was to examine the Soviets’ prospects back then for effecting a blitzkrieg against NATO. 
Mearsheimer mentions the distribution of material capabilities, i.e. the balance of forces in terms 
of manpower, weapons, reinforcement and mobilization. 74 
However, the driving forces in his analysis are not so much those neorealist variables but 
specific matters of strategic military doctrine. The contextual conditions are the deployment 
pattern of NATO forces in West Germany territory and the characteristics of the terrain. There are 
also some critical uncertainties. There is the assumption that NATO is able to mobilize its forces 
in due time, immediately after the Warsaw Pact starts mobilizing (strategic warning plus political 
decision). The other critical uncertainty stands as a limitation of the scenario as well, and refers to 
the fact that the study does not consider the impact of air forces on the balance. Interestingly 
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enough, what once was an exercise on future counterfactuals has become an exercise on past 
counterfactuals. 
 Finally, I would like to offer an example from classical geopolitical literature. Even though 
the methodology is never explicitly mentioned, it can be argued that Halford J. Mackinder uses 
some sort of scenario analysis in his famous 1904 article “The Geographical Pivot of History.”75 
Mackinder interprets world history as a recurrent confrontation between land powers and sea 
powers. He emphasizes the centrality of place and the efficient movement of ideas, goods, and 
people.76 During the so-called Columbian Age, the Atlantic-facing maritime empires of Western 
Europe dominated much of the known world, assisted by the superior mobility and flexibility of 
maritime as opposed to land transportation.77 
However, at the beginning of the post-Columbian epoch the balance of advantage was 
beginning to tip in favor of the land. Maritime mobility was now being challenged by continental 
mobility brought about by the development of transcontinental railways. 78  Railways were to 
replace horse and camel mobility, and their effect was to be felt at most in the vast spaces of 
Eurasia, laying within the Russian Empire and Mongolia. Their potentialities in population and 
wealth amount to a vast economic world which would permit the pivot power that controls it to 
stand within reach of an empire of the world.79 
Translated into scenario terminology, there are 1) driving forces: those historical forces 
that compel land and sea forces to confront one another; 2) contextual conditions: the geographical 
features of Eurasia, such as the Arctic ice in the north and the vast spaces of the Heartland, plentiful 
of wealth; the superiority of maritime transportation; 3) critical uncertainties: the game-changing 
implications of transcontinental railways, which will allow to alter the balance of land power 
mobility and sea power mobility in favor of the former; 4) potential futures: a pivot state 
controlling the lands of Eurasia and its vast continental resources for fleet-building will be able to 
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control the world. Technological developments, therefore, open the way for a future counterfactual 
in which history shall not repeat itself as in the previous Columbian Age.  
The advantage of conceiving Mackinder’s vision as a future counterfactual is that it allows 
us to settle the issue of its alleged determinism. Future counterfactuals are not predictions but 
devices to answer the question “What if?” In words of Oppenheimer, they make decision makers 
more receptive to early warning signs of new trends.80 
If the same reasoning were to be applied to other geopolitical works such as those of Douhet 
and De Seversky regarding command of the air, one could conclude that most of classical 
geopolitics is essentially about scenarios.   
 
2.3 Offensive realism scenarios for South America 
The following chapters will elaborate further on the different plausible futures that scenario 
methodology provides for South American regional system. 
Chapter 3 deals with the driving forces leading to the rise of Brazil. These are the 
international-level independent variables of offensive realism: distribution of power and relative 
material capabilities. Distribution of power refers to the place of the state in international relations. 
It considers political and military alliances, as well as regional integration processes. Relative 
material capabilities are latent power and military power, as defined in chapter 1. Latent power is 
primarily based on GDP growth and population size. I will qualify latent power even further by 
adding other indicators such as urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, 
and education level. The last factor is particularly critical because it is related to the eventual 
effectiveness of Brazilian military forces. For the purposes of this thesis it is assumed that Brazil 
is a relatively efficient state able to mobilize its resources and make optimal use of them. Of course, 
the reality might well be different from that ideal picture. For that reason, the last section of chapter 
3 addresses certain limitations of this approach. 
The first critical uncertainty for South American scenario is the presence and role of United 
States as a regional hegemon in the Americas. Any offensive realist account of a Brazilian attempt 
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at South American hegemony has to deal with the role of the United States as an offshore balancer. 
It is expected that the United States, as the only regional hegemon in the world, will try to check 
any potential candidate in other regions, even more so in its own backyard. However, this should 
not be taken for granted. Is it possible to imagine an underachieving intervention by the United 
States? What if intervention does not take place at all? Chapter 4 will introduce offensive realism 
theorizing on offshore balancing. In doing so, it will argue why the role of the United States is in 
fact a critical uncertainty for South American future. For example, United States could face much 
more pressing concerns related to China in East Asia. With the eyes of the regional hegemon 
focused elsewhere, Brazil could have a window of opportunity to make its move. 
If the South American states are left on their own, one alternative is to present an external 
balancing coalition against the potential regional hegemon. Chapter 5 deals with the prospects for 
external balancing. Both offensive realism and geopolitics play a role in this chapter. The 
geographical features of South America stand as a contextual condition, in the same manner as the 
geography of Eurasia stood in Mackinder’s pivot thesis. Particular attention is paid to the 
Amazonia as a buffer zone and its implications as regards incentives for balancing. 
Success in offshore or external balancing would result in one of the possible future 
scenarios for South America: “Brazilian hegemony prevented.” However, chapters 4 and 5 will 
leave a warning against blind reliance on this result. 
If both offshore and external balancing prove underachieving, Argentina will have to tackle 
Brazilian attempt at hegemony with a balancing of its own. Chapter 6 is about internal balancing. 
It applies neoclassical realist theories by Schweller and Taliaferro in order to evaluate the main 
challenges and options of Argentinean decision makers. At this point there will be two possible 
future scenarios, depending on whether internal balancing succeeds or not. These are “Brazilian 
hegemony prevented, and potential restored bipolarity,” and “Brazilian hegemony,” respectively. 
It is worth paying attention finally to at least one wild card, i.e. an event of high impact but 
low probability. Chapter 7 considers the re-nuclearization of South America, as a consequence of 
Brazil or Argentina abandoning the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and 







3. South America and the rise of Brazil 
 
The two previous chapters discussed and established the theoretical framework and the 
methodology of this thesis. It is now to turn focus on the rise of Brazil and its candidacy as regional 
hegemon in South America. However, before doing that, it is necessary, in order to avoid any 
confusion, to define specifically the regional system in which Brazil would be hegemon, and 
distinguish it from other regional conceptions.  
The first section of this chapter, therefore, discusses the merits of conceiving the entire 
South American continent as a regional system. Once this is done, the second section will address 
the relative material capabilities of the region, taking into account GDP, population, military 
personnel, military expenditure, steel production, and primary energy consumption. 
The third section discusses the distribution of power. Here I take into account not only the 
hierarchy of powers but also the military alliances and regional organizations. The fourth section 
will discuss specifically the meaning of a Brazilian hegemony. There is the traditional view that 
Brazil’s natural strategy rests on diplomacy and soft power. I challenge that assumption and ask 
whether the restraint shown hitherto is more an issue of capabilities rather than a peaceful spirit. 
The fifth section, finally, is about the limitations of Brazil and at the same time of this 
scenario approach. The assumption is that Brazil is able to mobilize and allocate its resources 
optimally, but this is of course the ideal situation. Here I show how reality may differ.  
 
3.1. The South American Regional System 
 The concept of South American continent as a regional system is not as self-evident as it 
seems at first glance, because there are other alternate conceptions in the literature of cultural 
geography and geopolitics. 
 The notion of Latin America needs no presentation. A vast region stretching from Mexico 
to Tierra del Fuego and encompassing the successor states of the territories of Spanish and 
Portuguese empires, and as a consequence with presumed cultural similarities, such as language 
and religion, which is fundamentally distinct from “Anglo-America” in the north. 
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On the other hand, geopolitical literature presents another more curious definition of South 
America. Saul Bernard Cohen and Robert D. Kaplan establish a hemispheric divide in the line of 
the northern Andes-Columbian Cordilleras and the southern Venezuelan-Guiana Highlands that 
border the Amazon. These physical accidents separate South America from Middle America. One 
argument is that the Panama Canal has made easier for northwestern South America (i.e. Colombia) 
to communicate with the Caribbean and the North Atlantic than overland with the rest of South 
America.81 
 Contrary to these two options, Teixeira argues that geographic proximity and patterns of 
interaction constitute the necessary and sufficient variables for the identification of a regional 
subsystem. Forms of interaction include diplomatic, political, social, economic, cultural and 
personal interactions, and its instruments can be diplomatic, psychological, cultural, economic or 
military. Its range goes from conflictual to cooperative. Neighboring states will tend to exhibit a 
relatively high degree of interaction. It is possible to evaluate patterns of interactions by means of 
three variables: wars and/or armed conflicts, trade, and regional organizations.82 
 When one looks at patterns of conflict, it is evident that it makes sense to distinguish South 
American continent as a whole different regional subsystem. There were armed conflicts in South 
America and armed conflicts in Central America, but never an inter-American level conflict. The 
great majority of conflicts were between direct neighbors over border issues, and belong to the era 
of state formation in South America. The War of the Pacific, for instance, took place from 1879 to 
1883, with Bolivia and Peru on one side and Chile on the other. The bitterest conflict was the War 
of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870) between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance of Argentina, the 
Empire of Brazil, and Uruguay. In the twentieth century, there was the Chaco War (1932-1935) 
between Bolivia and Paraguay, and some brief and localized border clashes between Ecuador and 
Peru in 1941 and 1995. I will return to the issue of South American conflicts in chapter 5. 
 Patterns of trade and regional organizations also seem to confirm the singularity of South 
America. Attempts to create inter-American economic organizations in the past were relatively 
fruitless, whereas South America itself has witnesses the formation of Mercosur and the Andean 
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Community. Of course, the Alliance of the Pacific and the Trans-Pacific Partnership represent 
challenges to this argument. However, it needs to be taken into account that the United States failed 
in 2005 when it tried to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
 Since the role of the United States in South America is one of the key elements in this 
thesis, the last factor mentioned above is particularly relevant. In this sense, Buzan and Wæver 
comment: “US engagement (in South America) is not constant and the United States neither rules 
the region nor even generally shapes it. South America basically has its own dynamics into which 
the USA intervenes irregularly.” This is not to deny that the relationship between the United States 
and South America is highly asymmetrical. However, the contrast between the overt operations in 
Central America and the Caribbean, and covert operations in South America such as in Chile in 
1973 show that the United States level of penetration in South America is considerably lower.83 
 The last argument for the singularity of South America as a regional unit of its own is the 
presence of Brazil. Brazil is the country that connects the Southern Cone with the northern part of 
the continent and gives coherence to the subsystem. Brazil connects the La Plata basin, the Andes, 
and the Amazon region. Brazil holds the South American regional system altogether, and it is thus 
justified to include the northern countries of South America in it. Another way to think about it is 
to imagine what South America would look like if Brazil had fragmented into several smaller 
republics,84 as it once was feared by Brazilians (see below). The next section is directly related to 
this since it is about relative material capabilities in South America. 
 
3.2 Relative material capabilities 
 The Federative Republic of Brazil is located in the east of South America, bordering the 
Atlantic Ocean. It shares common boundaries with every South American country except Chile 
and Ecuador. It is the world’s fifth largest country and the largest in South America by 
geographical area and population.85  
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However, during the first half of the twentieth century, the GDP of Brazil was always equal 
or slightly inferior to Argentina’s. Colombia caught up with Chile to compete closely by the third 
position, albeit both were very distant from Argentina and Brazil. In terms of percentage, 
Argentina and Brazil averaged each one 30% of the region during this period. Later on the century, 
and thanks to oil revenues, Venezuela would take the third position. However, the most dramatic 
change would take place in the first two positions (see table 2 below). 
 As a consequence of its neutral status during Second World War, Argentina was 
marginalized from U.S. Lend-Lease policy, and with it, financial and economic assistance to the 
region. This fact altered the existing balance of power in South America, which prior to Second 
World War was favorable to Argentina. Brazil, on the contrary, in retribution for its collaboration 
with the Allies, received via Lend-Lease more than two thirds of the war assistance destined to 
Latin America, becoming then the first military power in South America. But the United States 
also gave Brazil the sum of US$ 100 million via Export-Import Bank with the objective of 
mobilizing productive resources, and an additional US$ 45 million loan for the steel mill of Volta 
Redonda.86 
Naturally, this is not to say that this episode is the only explanatory variable of the 
subsequent rise of Brazil and the decadence of Argentina. Several other internal factors in both 
countries should be taken into account. But it is hard to ignore the fact that during the first half of 
the twentieth century, Brazil had a policy of accommodating the United States, whereas Argentina 
was more openly confrontational in many aspects, and the turning point in the South American 
balance of power took place immediately after the end of Second World War, when United States 
became undoubtedly the first great power in the world and its first rule-maker.87  
From 1950 on, Brazil took the lead and each decade the difference with Argentina was 
bigger. By 1975 Brazil’s GDP was two times the size of Argentina’s, and more than twice after 
1985 (see table 2). According to some authors, this is the threshold after which South American 
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system turned from bipolar to unipolar.88 One can ask if it is a coincidence that MERCOSUR was 
born at this moment.  
Year Argentina Brazil 
1905 19.702,886 14.365,000 
1915 26.183,334 19.688,000 
1925 40.597,244 30.556,000 
1935 51.523,918 42.722,000 
1945 67.042,120 64.236,000 
1955 99.125,000 118.960,000 
1965 141.960,000 203.444,000 
1975 211.850,000 455.918,000 
1985 209.641,000 675.090,000 
1995 282.653,000 866.086,000 
2005 353.381,000 1.110.868,000 
2014 537.700,000 2.417.000,000 
Table 2. GDP Levels (million US$ Dollars, Argentina and Brazil. 1905-201489 
   
In any case, as of 2013, Argentina’s share of South American GDP was reduced to 12.5% 
(from circa 30% during 1900-1950) and Brazil’s has risen to 55%. Moreover, Brazil is usually 
placed in the top ten of world’s largest economies.90 
It is safe to assume that this tendency constitutes a megatrend, i.e. a relative certainty which 
is not likely to change, be countered or turned around over the next decade. Even if Brazil enters 
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into an economic crisis with impact on its GDP growth in absolute terms, there is considerable 
margin in the gap with the rest of the countries so that distance in relative terms will not diminish. 
The same reasoning applies to population growth. As of 2016, Brazil’s population of 
204,519,000 constitutes 49.36% of South American population. By 2030, Brazil’s population is 
expected to reach 240 million and maintain the same proportion.91 Urban population in Brazil has 
duplicated since 1980 and continues to grow.92  
Therefore, megatrends of GDP growth and population growth, the two main indicators of 
latent power according to Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, are clearly favorable to Brazil. They 
constitute the driving forces of Brazilian rise to hegemony in South America, because they are the 
foundation of military power. 
Brazil has reduced its military personnel, from 450,000 in 1980 to 288,000 in 2007, but 
this is mainly a consequence of the end of the military regime and the return to democracy. The 
same tendency took place in Argentina. However, according to CENM’s estimations on military 
balance, total military personnel was 337,400 in 2013, about 30% of South America’s total. On 
the other hand, military expenditure soared from US$ 2,019,334 to US$ 20,559,000 in 2007, and 
US$ 32,449,492 in 2013, amounting to more than 50% of regional expenditures.93  
As regards steel production, it began in the 1920s. Its biggest leap forward came at the end 
of the 1940s with the creation of state Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN) and the U.S. loan 
for Volta Redonda, as it was mentioned above. State participated in most steel producing 
companies until the 1990s, when a privatization process was initialized. As of today, Brazil has 29 
steel mills, and is the ninth largest producer of steel in the world. In 2013, Brazil produced 34.2 
million tons of steel, which amounts to 70% of production in South America.94 Finally, when it 
comes to primary energy consumption, Brazil demanded 12.09546 Quadrillion Btu, i.e. 48.75% of 
the region in 2012.95  
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3.3 Distribution of power 
  
 According to Cohen, the state system consists of five orders or levels. The first consists of 
major powers. The second order are regional powers whose reach extends over much of their 
respective geopolitical regions. The third, fourth and fifth levels are those states whose reach is 
generally limited to part of their regions only. Cohen also distinguishes three categories of second-
order regional powers: high, medium and low.96 
 Cohen considers Brazil as an example of a high second-order power which has regional 
hegemonic aspirations and is likely to achieve dominance over its region (the other one being 
India). Argentina is an example of a low second-order power. Chile, Colombia and Venezuela are 
ranked third-order states. They can influence regional events in special ways and may compete 
with neighboring regional powers on ideological and political grounds, or by having a specialized 
resource base. The vast oil resources of Venezuela are a clear example. However, they lack the 
population, military, and general economic capacities of second-order rivals. Ecuador (and Peru, 
probably) is a fourth-order state who has impact only on their nearest neighbors. Fifth-order states 
have only marginal external involvement. Guyana and Suriname stand as a clear example thereof.97 
 In regard to the United States, which is obviously a first-order power in terms of Cohen, 
Buzan and Wæver argue that as long as there is no such a thing as an all-encompassing western 
hemisphere “regional security complex,”98 the United States stand as an extern actor to South 
America. It is true that the United States have been for the last century the only major external 
actor in South America. However, US visions for a regional system were regularly rejected by 
South American governments. Moreover, US interventions south of the Panama Canal have been 
sporadic at best, the 1973 Chile operation being perhaps the most known example. 
 I have already made reference to the major interstate wars in South America. These have 
been sporadic though, something I will go back to in chapter 5. Buzan and Wæver offer a list of 
interstate controversies. The central one is, of course, Brazil-Argentina. Questions of status 
(leadership in the region) and direct balance of power and competition for influence in the three 
buffer states between them. Brazil has traditionally feared encirclement by Spanish America led 
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by Argentina, and Argentina has traditionally feared Brazilian expansionism. This fear was 
historically shared also by Uruguay, Paraguay and Peru.99 When it comes to external allies, Buzan 
and Wæver observe that the United States often gave Brazil preferential treatment and Spanish 
America saw Brazil acting as U.S. regional lieutenant, using American assistance to become 
dominant in the region.100 (The United States that according to offensive realism is supposed to 
act as an off-shore balancer.) 
 John Child offers a review of Argentina’s concerns101 about: Brazilian expansion into the 
buffer states and also with Argentina’s own national territory, especially the province of 
Misiones;102 the nature of the Brazilian-U.S. relationship, by which Brazil is a satellite nation,103 
and so on. 
 The next category of interstate controversies include border disagreements between 
medium-sized states, in the form of dyads: Argentina-Chile, Chile-Bolivia, Chile-Peru, Peru-
Ecuador, Colombia-Venezuela, Guyana-Venezuela, and of course, Argentina-Great Britain over 
the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. 104  Historically, there were no formal alliances, but informal 
ententes following a checkboard pattern along the rivalries aforementioned. Therefore Argentina 
would sympathize with Peru, Chile would sympathize with Ecuador and Brazil, and so on. 
 The fact that the United States have been for the last century the only major external actor 
in South America is generally attributed, as everybody knows, to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. 
Mearsheimer, for example, explains that the United States established regional hegemony in the 
nineteenth century by “minimizing the influence of the United Kingdom and the other European 
great powers in the Americas, a policy commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine.”105 Buzan and 
Wæver, however, argue that this “ritual reference” is misleading, insofar as Latin America was 
actually not a major interest at the time and the United States did not really have the naval power 
necessary to enforce the Monroe Doctrine against the European countries of the Holy Alliance.106  
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On his part, Poggio Teixeira examines the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine beyond its 
original promulgation in 1823 and corroborates that, rather than being a policy directed to Latin 
America as a whole, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Roosevelt Corollary later, were in fact 
Caribbean in scope; moreover, Brazil in particular considered itself as a guarantor of the Monroe 
Doctrine in South America, by means of an “unwritten alliance” with the United States. According 
to Poggio Teixeira, this was not entirely reciprocated, but it was still convenient for the United 
States, in particular after Argentina adopted a strong anti-U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of 
twentieth century.107  
 In any case, if one had to mention a hemispheric defense agreement in the spirit of Monroe 
Doctrine, one can but make reference to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
(TIAR by the Spanish-language acronym), also known as the Rio Treaty or the Rio Pact, signed 
in 1947. Most of American states are or were at some point members, with the notable exception 
of Canada. The treaty was invoked several times, the last one being in 2001 after the September 
11 attacks. On occasion of Malvinas War, the United States, along with Chile and Colombia, had 
argued that Argentina was the aggressor and stood aside. This episode turned TIAR into dead letter 
in the eyes of the rest of Latin American countries. Citing this example, Mexico formally withdrew 
in 2002.108 The ALBA countries Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela withdrew in 2012. 
 From 2000 on, Brazil began to create a regional architecture of its own that excluded the 
United States. In 2001, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso proposed to South American 
Presidents a South American Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration (IIRSA) with 
support from the Brazilian development bank BNDES. In 2008, the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) was created: a new regional security council that not only excluded the United 
States, but also Canada, Mexico and Central America, which were seen as too close to the United 
States. Most recently, Brazil has worked to create the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC) which excludes the United States and Canada.109 
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However, the performance of these new multilateral institutions is limited at best. With 
limited budgets, personnel, and inconsistent leadership, they have “essentially devolved into 
opportunities for presidential summitry in the region,” providing forums for ad-hoc crisis 
resolutions or interpersonal negotiations rather than binding regimes. Moreover, even though 
Brazil successfully excluded the United States from UNASUR and CELAC, it was not able to 
persuade other states in the region from cooperating with United States. The strong U.S.-
Colombian partnership is the best example.110 
Will the time come when Brazil recurs to military power in South America to protect its 
interests or assert its leadership? The next section deals directly with this question. 
 
3.4 Asserting regional leadership 
  Harold Trinkunas argues that Brazil’s aspirations to major power status have been a 
constant, but that its attempts to rise have failed historically due to lack of capabilities when 
presented with the available opportunities.111  
Brazil’s capabilities, in fact, have been those of a developing country for much of its history. 
It relied largely on commodity exports until it industrialized during and after World War II. 
However, it joined the allied cause in World War I as a co-belligerent and sought a permanent seat 
on the Council of the League of Nations. When that seat was granted to a defeated Germany, a 
disappointed Brazil withdrew from the League of Nations. In World War II, Brazil participated to 
a more significant extent, contributing an army division to the Italian front. In return, the United 
States not only contributed with financial aid, as it was mentioned before. President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt advocated for Brazil’s permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council, an 
idea met with resistance from the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. As of today, Brazil is 
one of four states advocating for a new permanent seat in the Security Council, alongside Germany, 
India, and Japan. Brazil has also joined the G-20 group of Finance and Economy Ministers, and 
has taken a leadership role in World Trade Organization and global climate change negotiations.112 
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On the South American regional level, Brazil has tried to foster its leadership by regional 
integration and multilateral diplomacy. Concrete moves towards regional integration commenced 
in the 1980s, with the negotiation of Mercosur, a new common market arrangement with Argentina 
(and also Paraguay and Uruguay), which transformed its traditional rival into a trade partner.113 
Mercosur is often attributed to the re-democratization of Argentina and Brazil. A less 
idealistic, less liberal approach, more oriented toward material capabilities, would stress the point 
that by 1985 Brazil’s GDP was already more than two times bigger than Argentina’s, changing 
therefore the regional polarity from bipolar to unipolar.114    
There is also the usual narrative of the peaceful character of Brazil. As Bertonha 
acknowledges, the two only major military actions of Brazil abroad were the War of the Triple 
Alliance and the involvement in Second World War, almost a century apart from one another. 
Since then, Brazil has only acted in peaceful international missions. Brazil has not been in a war 
against its neighbors for more than 140 years and its frontiers are consolidated.115 The only armed 
conflicts with Argentina were the Cisplatine War (1825-1828) and the Platine War (1851-1852), 
the latter caused by fear of expansionist plans by Argentina.  
As it was mentioned at the end of previous section, even though Brazil was able to create 
a new regional architecture of multilateral institutions excluding the United States, these eventually 
proved underachieving due to lack of commitment and capacity to contain free-riding by the rest 
of South American states. In the words of Trinkunas, “Brazil’s strategy of consensus and 
institutional building has only had limited success in persuading other states in South America to 
adhere to the new order.”116 
As a consequence, there are some Brazilians who begin to lose patience. In “Brazil: an 
emerging military power?...,” Joao Fabio Bertonha wonders about the narrative of a benign Brazil 
inherently identified with “dialog and continuous concessions:” 117  “There is the question of 
whether this is the posture assumed by the Brazilian elite or simply an option that has arisen out 
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of circumstances, derived from the cold evaluation of Brazil’s strategic possibilities.” The author 
then mentions a conclusion by Alsina Jr.: the national tradition for non-confrontational politics “is 
also a reflection of weakness in national military power.” 118 
According to Bertonha, the entire South-American union project, essential to the region’s 
progress, can only be done with Brazil at the center and only the Brazilian leadership can deal with 
this project successfully. Unfortunately, “Brazil seems to hesitate when it has to use its power and 
influence to accelerate and keep this process running. (…) This wish to show goodwill may be 
seen as a weakness and no leadership can be seen in this light.” The author goes on with concepts 
such as “renunciation of military hegemony,” “a real capacity for intervention,” and so on. Finally, 
he says, 
This paper does not suggest bombing Montevideo city to prevent Uruguay from 
leaving Mercosur, obtaining Bolivian gas with a large army, or blocking Buenos 
Aires harbor in order to bring Argentina back into the Mercosur project. But a 
stronger position (even if the definition of ‘strength’ might be difficult) may be 
necessary to advance the integration project.119 
 Military power does not need to be used but it needs to be reliable. The acquisition of a 
reliable military capability would support Brazilian role as leader of the continent.120 Bertonha 
concludes that “the premise that Brazil can grow to become one of the world’s main powers 
without hegemony or domination is, at least, arguable,” and a state with such aims “cannot just 
refuse to exert power.”121 
 I would like to make a few points regarding the arguments of Bertonha. In the first place, 
of course, my strategy for this thesis is not to claim that Bertonha is somehow representative of 
the opinion of Brazilian elites, or that his article or any article of similar content circulates among 
the elites, or anything of the sort.  
                                                 
118 Bertonha, “Brazil: an emerging military power?” 110; Joao Paulo Soares Alsina Jr., “O poder militar como 
instrumento da política externa brasileira contemporánea,” Rev. Bras. Polít. Int. 52, no. 2, 2009: 173-191. 
119 Bertonha, “Brazil: an emerging military power?” 113. 
120 Bertonha, “Brazil: an emerging military power?” 114. 
121 Bertonha, “Brazil: an emerging military power?” 119. 
50 
 
Bertonha does make an interesting point, though, which is that maybe the peaceful 
trajectory of Brazil is not so much a reflection of their intentions or their spirit for dialogue, but of 
their capabilities. Here it is definitely worth remembering one of offensive realism assumptions, 
namely that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. 
Furthermore, as Mearsheimer points out, intentions may be peaceful today, but we cannot 
foresee what intentions will be in the future. “It is simply impossible, for example, to know what 
Germany or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors in 2025”. 122  Moreover, “it is 
impossible to identify who will be running the foreign policy of any country 5 or 10 years from 
now.” Finally, “leaders come and go and some are more hawkish than others.”123 I see no reason 
why this should be less valid for Brazil than it is for Germany, Japan, or even China. Conceding 
that Brazil is today a democracy with peaceful intentions, there is no way to know who will run 
Brazil in 2025. For this reason I mistrust democratic peace theory as an assurance for security 
policy, and this regardless even of the problematic task of characterizing the meaning of 
“democracy,” especially in South America. For instance, is Maduro’s Venezuela a democracy? 
Another point is related to the meaning of hegemony. A hegemon is a state that is so 
powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. But how is this hegemony manifested? 
In the worst case (from the point of view of the other states in the system) it is manifested through 
offense and conquest. Mearsheimer rejects the defensive realist claim that offense rarely succeeds. 
By means of example, he mentions Bismarck’s unification of Germany and the creation of the 
United States as we know it today.124 
However, this does not mean that hegemony equals a constant thrust towards expansion. 
For instance, Mearsheimer argues that China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself 
and neighbors like India, Japan and Russia, but it is unlikely to pursue military superiority so that 
it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a 
possibility.” Mearsheimer is thinking of Imperial Japan between 1931 and 1942. Instead, China 
will want to be in a position where it can dictate rules of behavior to its neighbors.125  
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Likewise, a hegemonic Brazil will probably not want to send armies to reconquer 
Uruguayan territory, or Paraguay, or even the north-eastern provinces of Argentina (Misiones and 
Corrientes), although this should not be completely off the table. Fears of the disappearance of the 
buffer states were real once in the past, ironically, the other way around. I have already mentioned 
the Platine War (1851-1852). Back then, Brazil was concerned about Argentinean leader Juan 
Manuel de Rosas and its plans to reconquer Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia in order to reestablish 
the territory of the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, and furthermore, to invade Brazil and 
secede Rio Grande do Sul from the rest of the country.126 
Brazil will probably like to avoid episodes like Bolivian expropriation of Petrobras 
interests in 2006, or the Colombian agreement over US military basing rights in 2010. Following 
the China analogy, just as a rising China is likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, Brazil 
is likely to try to push the United States out of South America. Hitherto, the means of dealing with 
crisis such as these were strictly diplomatic. However, once again, this is maybe more a matter of 
capabilities than of intentions.  
Military power does not necessarily need to be exercised, but it needs to be a credible threat. 
Brazilian military power is not a credible threat yet, hence Bolivia expropriates Petrobras and 
Colombia allows US military bases, Argentina free rides on Mercosur, and so on. Short of regional 
hegemony backed by substantial military power, the other South American states will be able to 
challenge rules of behavior dictated by Brazil. 
To qualify as a potential hegemon, a state must have –by some reasonably large margin- 
the most formidable army as well as the most latent power among all the states located in its 
region.127 Brazil represents already 55% of South American GDP; 50% of its population, 30% of 
its military personnel and 50% of its military expenditure; 70% of steel production and 48.75% of 
primary energy consumption. Moreover, no other state in the region comes even close to Brazil in 
any of those indicators. Argentina is the second ranked in average, but still far away in absolute 
terms. 
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 If the premises of offensive realism are reliable guidelines to forecast a future scenario, it 
is a matter of time before Brazil puts all its vast resources in line and starts asserting its power over 
the other states in the region. Of course it would have to proceed carefully and maybe even wait 
for the proper window of opportunity, as I will argue in the next chapter, but the capabilities will 
be there. However, one of the problems with this approach is that it takes for granted that Brazil’s 
ability to dispose of its capabilities will be optimal. 
 
3.5 Limitations of the approach 
 Offensive realism suggests there is no such a thing as an innocent rise in capabilities. The 
more capabilities a state has, and the greater the gap between that state and its neighbors in the 
system, the more it will be driven to assert its power when provided the opportunity to do so. There 
is a fundamental intrinsic assumption here, which is that states can make optimal use of its 
capabilities. Addressing the implications of this assumption is fundamental in order to understand 
the limitations of an offensive realist approach. 
 I will comment on three elements which may hinder an optimal use of state’s capabilities. 
The first one is the quality of military equipment. The second one is the modern system of force 
employment, and directly related to it, the quality of education. This is important because it will 
reflect on the skills of the soldiers who will make use of that military equipment. The third one is 
military organizational practices.  
  Firstly, Bertonha observes that in 2007-2008, the quality of Brazilian military equipment 
seemed to be at its lowest level. Even though the Brazilian army counts with circa 300,000 soldiers, 
there is a dramatic lack of modern equipment, maintenance and training. The second-hand German 
and American tanks and armored fighting vehicles are from the 1970s, and only 30% are 
operational. Its antiaircraft artillery had to be aimed and fired manually and its artillery was 
obsolete. A similar diagnosis was to be made of the Air Force and the Navy. Moreover, whatever 
purchase was made was based on opportunity instead of on real needs. The mobilization system is 
defective. The industrial-military complex is very limited. There is a dependence on foreign 
equipment and technology.128 The situation has improved a little bit since then, as military budget 
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increased considerably. As regards the structure of the defense expenditure, in 2012, for example, 
18.67% was destined to investments, twice the percentage of 2008.129 All in all, it will take time 
to compensate many decades of lacking investment. 
 A large army combined with quantity and quality of equipment are certainly welcomed 
conditions for any state. However, according to Stephen Biddle, the key variables to predict 
outcome in modern combat are not technology or sheer number of troops but the effective use of 
modern system of force employment. Biddle defines this so-called modern system as a complex 
of cover, concealment, dispersion suppression, small-unit independence maneuver, and combined 
arms integration at the tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the 
operational level of war. It is then the implementation of this modern system what explains combat 
outcomes, and not mere technological superiority. Those countries that master the art of modern 
system are most likely to prevail in battle.130  
Biddle does not say that technology does not help at all, rather that technology is not the 
only variable to have in mind. It acts as an intervening variable that multiplies the effect of the key 
variable which is the application of the modern system.131 The greater the technological advantage 
the employer of the modern system has, the more lopsided will be its success. Technological 
advantages matter when they occur together with asymmetries in force employment.132 In this 
context, the level of education of a state is essential in order to achieve an efficient application of 
the modern system of force employment.  
In the case of Brazil, the level of education ranks somewhere between disastrous to very 
bad. Access is not an issue, for practically all children between ages of seven and ten are in school. 
However, many students in primary and secondary education are lagging behind. Half the students 
in secondary education attend evening classes, many of them work and are older than they should, 
and the contents of their courses tend to be irrelevant. The student’s ability to learn is limited by a 
tradition of bad quality instruction.133 
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As a result, two-thirds of 15-year-olds are capable of no more than basic arithmetic. Half 
cannot draw inferences from what they read, or give any scientific explanation for familiar 
phenomena. Even private, fee-paying schools are mediocre. Bad teachers are the biggest handicap. 
By global standards Latin American teachers are themselves very poorly educated. But in Brazil, 
they are not trained in subject matter nor teaching skills. They are ill-prepared and unmotivated.134 
Perhaps for these reasons, Bertonha objects a move to reverse the trend of 
professionalization in the Armed Forces in favor of compulsory service, even though the draft 
would provide soldiers at a low cost.135  
Finally, there is the issue of military organizational practices. Caitlin Talmadge argues that 
regimes facing significant coup threats are unlikely to adopt military organization practices that 
maximize military capability, because many of the same skills that heighten a military’s prowess 
in conventional wars also have the potential to make it more threatening to political leaders at 
home. This is reflected in four activities. First, promotion patterns, which generate the military’s 
human capital, deliberately select against officers with proven combat prowess. Second, realistic 
training provides opportunities for improving military skills that could be used against the regime, 
therefore it is restricted. Third, command authority is concentrated at the top, with virtually no 
authority devolved to the field, even regarding tactical matters. Lastly, there is restriction of 
horizontal communication within the military and distortion of vertical communication.136 There 
is the possibility that Brazil, in light of its past of military coups, has incurred in some of these ill-
fated practices. Argentina has certainly gone down this path. 
Therefore, a complete assessment of Brazil’s military capabilities would have to take into 
account these three elements: technology or equipment, skills and education, and organizational 
practices. They could give an idea of the minimum and maximum limits within which a state can 
display its material power capabilities.  
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4. The United States as an offshore balancer 
 
This chapter addresses the first research question of the thesis: should Argentina rely on 
extra regional balancing conducted by the United States? The chapter is divided as follows: In the 
first section I present the offensive realist theory of offshore balancing as stated in Mearsheimer’s 
book Tragedy of Great Power Politics. The next sections look at the fine print of this theorizing 
in order to argue why Argentina should not simply wait in confidence for U.S. assistance: Brazil 
might take advantage of a window of opportunity and even if helps come, it will only come as a 
last resource. Moreover, offshore balancing might have unexpected consequences.  
 
4.1 Offshore balancing in theory 
According to Mearsheimer, it is virtually impossible for any state to achieve global 
hegemony. The principal impediment to world domination is the difficulty of projecting power 
across the world’s oceans onto the territory of a rival great power. Consequently, the best outcome 
a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is 
nearby and accessible over land. Moreover, the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only 
regional hegemon in the world. In other words, states that achieve regional hegemony seek to 
prevent great powers in other regions from duplicating their feat.137 
 Aspiring hegemons in other regions must be checked not because they could strike across 
the ocean and launch an amphibious assault. After all, the separating power of waters works in 
both directions. However, a rival great power that dominates its own region will be an especially 
powerful foe that is essentially free to cause trouble in the other great power’s backyard by helping 
to upset the balance of power there. Specifically, a regional hegemon might someday face a local 
challenge from an upstart state, which would surely have strong incentives to ally with the distant 
hegemon to protect itself from attack. The distant hegemon could project its power by transporting 
troops and supplies across the water to the friendly territory of its ally into the rival hegemon’s 
backyard. This would not be an amphibious attack across the sea, but merely ferrying troops. In 
this case, providing the ability to move freely across the ocean, the water’s stopping power would 
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have little effect.138 This would have been the case, for example, if the French intervention in 
Mexico (1861-1867) had not come to an end. 
 How regional hegemons prevent other great powers from dominating far-off regions 
depends on the balance of power in those areas. If power is distributed rather evenly among the 
major states, so there is no potential hegemon among them, the distant hegemon can safely stay 
out of any conflict in those regions, because no state is powerful enough to conquer all of the others. 
Regional hegemons prefer that there be at least two great powers located together in other region, 
so their proximity forces them to concentrate their attention on each other rather than on the distant 
hegemon. The distant regional hegemon would prefer not to intervene each time a potential 
hegemon emerges in another region. The distant hegemon’s first preference would rather be to 
leave the containment of the potential hegemon to the local great powers and watch from the 
sidelines. This is simple logic of buck-passing. States prefer to buck-pass than to balance when 
faced with a dangerous opponent. Only if the local great powers were unable to do the job, then 
the distant hegemon would take the appropriate measures to deal with the threatening state, i.e. 
move in and balance against it. The distant hegemon would also look for opportunities to 
undermine the threat and reestablish a rough balance of power in the region, so that it could return 
home. When this happens, the distant regional hegemon becomes a so-called off-shore balancer. 
However, regional hegemons would prefer to be the balancer of last resort.139 
The United Kingdom and the United States are generally regarded as the best examples of 
off-shore balancers. The United Kingdom was substantially more powerful than any other 
European state during most of the nineteenth century. However, it did not attempt to translate its 
abundant wealth into actual military might and attempt to dominate Europe. The reason it did not 
do so is the stopping power of water. Still, according to Mearsheimer, the United Kingdom has 
consistently acted as an offshore balancer in Europe, as offensive realism would predict.140  
Similarly, Mearsheimer explains that the United States achieved regional hegemony in the 
Americas, the only state in modern times to do so. By 1850 it had already acquired a huge land 
mass over which its rule needed to be consolidated. The United States did not attempt to conquer 
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territory in either Europe or Northeast Asia during the twentieth century because of the difficulty 
of projecting military forces across the oceans. Not even the United States, then, have the military 
capability to become a global hegemon. However, American military forces were sent to Europe 
and Northeast Asia on several occasions during the twentieth century according to the dictates of 
offensive realism. Whenever a potential peer competitor emerged in Europe or Northeast Asia, the 
United States sought to undermine it and remain thus the sole regional hegemon in the world. Even 
though at first the United States preferred to pass the buck to other great powers, eventually it had 
to use its own military forces in order to restore a balance of power.141  
In this context, one might reasonably think that the United States would ultimately check 
on any Brazilian attempt for regional hegemony in South America. In the next section I will argue 
why the rest of South American states, particularly Argentina, would be unwise to just rest assured 
and wait confident that in case of a Brazilian aggression, the U.S. help will invariably come at the 
end to save the day. 
 
4.2 Windows of opportunity 
 In the previous section, I have mentioned the French intervention in Mexico (1861-1867). 
On that occasion, the Second French Empire under Napoleon III of France invaded Mexico and 
established a client state called the Second Mexican Empire (1863-1867). The United States found 
themselves in the middle of the American Civil War (1861-1865). Therefore, the enforcement of 
Monroe Doctrine had to wait until 1867, but eventually the French withdrew.  
Whether this was caused by the guerrilla resistance led by Benito Juarez, by U.S. pressure 
upon France, or a combination of both, is not so relevant in regard to the two points I want to make, 
which are the following: firstly, the United States were unable to prevent French invasion at its 
initial stages. Secondly, seven years passed between the invasion and the final departure of French 
troops. I will come back to the second point in the next section. 
 As was the case back then, the United States might find themselves in no position to react 
swiftly to a Brazilian military action, if they would be distracted, for instance, acting as offshore 
balancers somewhere else. After all, offensive realism is usually invoked to refer to an eventual 
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future confrontation in East Asia between the People’s Republic of China and the United States. 
Mearsheimer himself is focused primarily in this scenario. 
 The argument is well known, and in a sense, this thesis is founded on the very same logic. 
In Mearsheimer’s words, “if China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few 
decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with 
considerable potential for war.” This is because “an increasingly powerful China is also likely to 
try to push the United States out of Asia” and try to come up with its own Chinese version of the 
Monroe Doctrine.142 Offensive realism expects China to attempt regional hegemony in East Asia 
and the United States to react as an offshore balancer. 
 United States commitment to the events in East Asia would provide Brazil with the 
opportunity to make its offensive move, for example, invading the northeastern provinces of 
Argentina, if they would ever conceive such intentions. Of course the White House and the UN 
Security Council would condemn the episode, and might even impose sanctions on Brazil and send 
weapons or economic aid the resistance, providing there is any resistance at all. 
 But apart from that, would the United States be committed to fight two offshore balancing 
wars at the same time, or would they prioritize East Asia over South America? After all, South 
America has been historically a region of little relevance for the United States (and geopolitical 
thought in general, for that matter). 
Let us assume that Poggio Teixeira is wrong and the scope of Monroe Doctrine extends 
beyond the Caribbean and reaches South America. Even so, Monroe Doctrine is about forbidding 
colonial intervention by extra regional powers. Back then, European powers. Nowadays it could 
probably include China.  
There is no hint, however, that Monroe Doctrine cares about internal distribution of power 
in South America. There was no need for that in nineteenth century, logically, because South 
American states were underdeveloped and were not regarded as powers at all. But based upon 
historical record, nothing indicates that United States feels uncomfortable with Brazil running the 
continent. Quite on the contrary: “The United States has been prepared to allow, indeed has at 
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times encouraged, Brazil to assume the leading role in South America.”143 Brazil, on his part, 
viewed the United States as most sympathetic to its own aspirations.144  
So even if other South American states are persuaded that United States will eventually 
intervene, perhaps Brazil is not so persuaded. This uncertainty, whether a miscalculation or not, 
could make Brazil more prone to take risks.   
  
4.3 Implications of offshore balancing for third states involved 
In the first section, I have explained that regional hegemons would prefer not to intervene 
each time a potential hegemon emerges in another region. They prefer to buck-pass and let local 
great powers to face the threatening state. Offshore-balancer would intervene only as a last resort. 
This is historically accurate. But apart from that, the consequences of the war for third states 
involved are unpredictable and not always pleasant. Mearsheimer does not mention it because its 
theory is concerned about great powers only. Let us see some examples. 
The Seventh Coalition eventually defeated Napoleon in Waterloo, but the Republic of 
Venice, independent until 1797, ceased to exist as such and was never to return again. Prospects 
for a resurrected independent Poland would have to wait one more century after most of the Duchy 
of Warsaw was given to Imperial Russia. 
The United States entered World War I only in April 1917, and World War II in December 
1941. By that time, both conflicts were already in their third year. The war was eventually won by 
United States and its allies. Meanwhile, however, those countries which were theaters of 
operations suffered a significant amount of destruction and casualties.  
In the case of World War II, France, Belgium and the Netherlands remained occupied until 
1944. Great Britain was not occupied but endured sustained bombardment during the Battle of 
Britain. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe also suffered occupation as well. The 
aftermath of the war left Great Britain and France extenuated, and they would eventually lose their 
status of first-order powers in favor of United States and the Soviet Union. Central and Eastern 
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Europe, and the Baltic States, would remained tied into the Soviet-led Communist bloc until 1989. 
Similarly, in Asia, Imperial Japan was defeated, but in the meantime China and other countries 
took the burden of the war in their own homelands, and once it was over, the Communists took 
control of mainland China, Korea was divided and remains divided as of today, and so on.  
The point I am trying to make is the following: offensive realism is a theory about first-
order powers and their interactions, or put differently, about aggregate results in the international 
system. However, this thesis is about the implications of Brazilian hegemony for Argentina; in 
other words, it is concerned about the specific implications of offensive realism for states which 
are not first-order powers.  
Offensive realism expects offshore balancing. But even if it eventually occurs, this is little 
comfort for states who in the meantime have to endure a painful occupation, as it was the case of 
China, Poland or Czechoslovakia in World War II, or as it would be the case of Argentina (or any 
other South American state) should Brazil be willing to employ its offensive capabilities. 
Therefore, South American states, and Argentina in particular, should not stand idle on the 
perspective of Brazilian rise to hegemony just because offensive realism expects the United States 
to intervene. First of all, if the United States were facing more pressing concerns, for example in 
East Asia regarding China, Brazil could seize this opportunity to make its move, and the United 
States might not intervene at all, or wait years before intervention.  
It hardly matters whether this is a miscalculation on part of Brazil. If United States does 
eventually intervene, it only means that the war has already started, maybe occupation has taken 
place, and the local players were not able to deter it. Even in light of a future eventual victory, this 
matters little for those states in which theaters of operation are located. Finally, in the aftermath of 
the conflict, the local players might yet discover an unpredictable price for a victory that was not 
achieved by their own means.  
It would be much better to avoid the breakout of a war from the beginning. One option for 
that is to send a signal to the threatening state that a balancing coalition is ready to check its 
ambitions. This is quite often a difficult task, though, and as I shall argue in the next chapter, very 




5. Geopolitics of South America and external balancing 
 
This chapter is divided in three sections. In the first one, I introduce geographical variables. 
In terms of scenario methodology, these are the contextual conditions. The next section describes 
the geography of South America and its historical implications for the patterns of cooperation and 
conflict. My purpose is to illustrate why geography matters when it comes to understanding South 
America. The final section analyzes the possibility of external balancing against Brazil. 
 
5.1 The return of geopolitics 
 In chapter 1, I mentioned two geographical elements that must be considered when it comes 
to balancing. The first one is relative position or distance. States nearer the threat are more likely 
to engage in balancing than are more distant states. Since the ability to project power declines with 
distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. The second one 
is related to the first. It is the presence of a buffer zone, which could be the territory of another 
state or a geographical barrier such as a large body of water. 
 In the original Waltzian structural realism, the international distribution of power alone 
was sufficient to explain the patterns of cooperation (alliances) and conflict (wars). According to 
Grygiel, Waltz’s Theory of International Politics represents the apogee of a social scientific 
tendency toward mono-causal explanations based on variables such as anarchy or state power, 
where international relations are an exclusively social or human realm whose origins and moving 
factors are to be found in the actors or in the system that they willingly (or unwillingly) create. 
Geography had been abandoned due to a drive to make theories more elegant and simple, but also 
due to the misuse of geography by ideologically motivated authors, such as Haushofer.145 
 Mearsheimer’s inclusion of relative distance and buffer zones is not unprecedented, though, 
and it was probably inspired by the reintroduction of these variables into the discussion of 
international relations by some defensive realists.  
                                                 
145 Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 1-20. 
62 
 
Firstly, Stephen Walt argued that distance affects the perception of threat, as mentioned in 
chapter 1.146 However, Grygiel observes, distance alone does not explain much. Great Britain and 
France differed in their perception of threat from German power, even though they are roughly 
equidistant from Germany. Naturally, the difference is explained by the existence of the Channel 
between Great Britain and the continent, and the lack of powerful natural barriers between France 
and Germany.147 
Secondly, Robert Jervis observed that geography affects the security dilemma by 
influencing the offense-defense balance. Few physical factors favor the attacker but many favor 
the defender, because the defender usually has the advantage of cover. In this way, anything that 
increase the amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes his progress across it, or makes 
him more vulnerable while crossing, increases the advantage accruing to the defense. When states 
are separated by natural defensive barriers, such as oceans, large rivers, and high mountains, 
conquest is more difficult. The defender can prevail against superior numbers, only by staying on 
its side of the barrier.148 
It is often argued that the development of long-range bombers, nuclear weapons, and 
ballistic missiles, has changed radically the nature of warfare, and thus the geographical barriers 
have lost all its military importance. However, this is misleading. It might be true when it comes 
to direct conflict between nuclear powers, but these are only a small elite. The vast majority of 
states in the world, and especially the South American states which are the actors of this thesis, do 
not possess nuclear weapons and therefore their military operations remain conventional. 
As C. Dale Walton observes, “while geography might have had little meaningful impact 
on a US-Soviet central nuclear war, it certainly is not irrelevant to most conventional engagements.” 
Despite the technological advances that have allowed overcoming most of the natural barriers, 
conventional military operations remain subject to the real possibilities that offer the operation 
theaters, and will remain so in the foreseeable future.149 Robert D. Kaplan puts it this way: “anyone 
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who truly believes that geography has been pivotally downgraded is profoundly ignorant of 
military logistics (…) Terrain determines the pace and method of fighting.”150  
Even the involvement of a first-order power like United States in Iraq and Afghanistan 
required a conventional military operation. If this is true for United States, which possesses state-
of-the-art technology and the highest military budget in the world, then it most also be true for 
South American states in which the military technology is particularly outdated and military 
budgets are relatively lower when compared to other regions.  
 Hence, offensive realism has place for geographic variables. The most evident implication 
is that oceans diminish the capacity to project power and therefore great powers must satisfy 
themselves with regional hegemony. This was discussed already in previous chapters. It is also 
necessary to pay attention to the implication of geographic features other than oceans. 
  
5.2 The geography of South America 
 The shape of South America is roughly triangular, being broad in the north and tapering to 
a point in the south.151 The western edge of the continent is rimmed by the Andes, one of the 
world’s longest and highest mountain ranges, extending from Tierra del Fuego to northeastern 
Venezuela. There are hundreds of peaks more than 4,500 meters tall, many of which are volcanic. 
Mt. Aconcagua (6,962 m.), located in Argentina, is the tallest mountain outside the Himalayan 
range. Ojos del Salado (6960 m.), in the Argentinean-Chilean border, is the tallest volcano in the 
world. The Andes also feature high plateaus such as the altiplano of Peru and Bolivia, which has 
an elevation of 3,700 meters. Potosi, a city located in Bolivian altiplano, was for centuries the 
location of the Spanish colonial mint, its population exceeding 200,000 people already in the 
seventeenth century. At 4,090 meters, it is one of the highest cities in the world. The northern and 
central Andes also contain three of the world’s highest capitals: Bogotá, Quito, and La Paz (the 
highest of all).152 
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 Except between Argentina and Chile, the crests of the Andes do not serve as national 
boundaries. In the south, the Andes form a sufficiently high, narrow and unpopulated single range 
that functions as boundary. In the north, three distinct ranges are separated by high valleys, and in 
the center, there are two ranges and one high valley, both forming a wide habitable zone. The 
borders are located to the east already in Amazonian territory.153 
 South America has two principal highland areas: the Brazilian Highlands and the Guiana 
Highlands, stretching along the continent’s eastern and northern sides, respectively. The Brazilian 
Highlands are lower than the Andes (1000 m. average) and cover most of south and center parts 
of Brazilian coast.154  The Guiana Highlands are also a low-mountain region that covers the 
southern half of Venezuela, all of the Guianas except for the low Atlantic coastal plain, the northern 
part of Brazil, and a portion of southeastern Colombia. There is abundance of rainfall, and no dry 
season. The vegetation is mostly tropical rainforest.155 
  The major drainage divide in South America is along the crest of the Andes, so rain that 
falls only 160 km. east of the Pacific may flow to the Atlantic Ocean.156 There are three major 
basins, ordered from north to south: Orinoco, Amazonas, and La Plata.  
The Orinoco basin is bordered by the Andes to the west and north, the Guiana Highlands 
to the east, and the Amazon basin to the south, and encompasses approximately four fifths of 
Venezuela and one fourth of Colombia. Orinoco River flows 2,740 km from its source in the 
Guiana Highlands to its mouth in the Atlantic Ocean, most of the trajectory throughout Venezuelan 
territory, except for a section that forms part of the frontier between Venezuela and Colombia.157  
 The second major physiographic feature of South America (after the Andes) is the Amazon 
Basin, which dominates the central north portion of the continent, and is bounded by the Andes to 
the west, the Guiana highlands to the north, and the Brazilian highlands in the southeast. In this 
context, the Amazon basin is the largest river basin in the world. The Amazon rainforest, also 
called the Amazon Jungle, covers most of the Amazon basin. The area of the rainforest is 5,500,000 
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km2. The largest portion of the Amazon territory belongs to Brazil, and the rest is shared among 
Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.158 It is worth insisting that the borders between 
Brazil and its neighbors to the west are not the crest of the Andes, but the borders are located in 
the rainforest. Thus, for example, the Andes are located roughly in the center of Peru, and all the 
eastern edge of the country is rainforest. 
 The La Plata basin is the second most important drainage system, and is located in south-
central South America. Its most important rivers are the Paraguay, Paraná and Uruguay. The 
Paraguay River origins in Brazil, crosses Paraguay and later forms the border with Argentina to 
the west, until it empties into the Parana River near the Argentinean city of Corrientes. The Parana 
River also forms the frontier between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina (the Triple Frontier). After 
the confluence of Paraguay, it flows south throughout Argentinean territory into the estuary of Río 
de la Plata. The Uruguay River, which is the eastern border of Argentina, separating it from Brazil 
and Uruguay, flows into the Parana Delta a few kilometers north of the estuary. Montevideo, the 
capital of Uruguay, is located on the northern shore of the estuary, and Buenos Aires, on the 
southwestern shore.159 
 When it comes to human geography, the South American continent shows a vacuum in its 
hinterland. Population remains concentrated along the continent’s periphery, and most of the 
interior is sparsely peopled. In the west, the national ecumenes of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and 
Chile are all confined to mountain basins hundreds of miles from each other. This means that 
population centers –the capital cities and business nodes- are mostly in the highlands. In the east, 
the population is located in Atlantic coastal regions. The vast majority of Brazilian population lives 
in the Brazilian highlands or on the narrow coastal region adjacent to it. In Argentina, population 
is concentrated in the La Plata basin. The weight of the continent’s population and resources is in 
this eastern side: Brazil, Argentina, and also Uruguay and Paraguay.  Finally, in contrast to the 
populated western and eastern edges of the continent, the interior of South America is a hollow 
core due to rain forest, dry grassland, and Patagonian desert.160  
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 What has been the geopolitical significance of these physic and human geographic 
characteristics?  
In chapter 3, I have already made reference to the issue of interstate wars in South America. 
The Wars of Independence against Spanish rule that took place in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century concluded in 1824 with the Battle of Ayacucho in Peru. After that, there were clashes 
proper of state formation period, in which boundaries are settled; the most important was the 
aforementioned War of the Pacific.  
However, most of violence in South America was intra-state, in the form of civil wars. In 
twentieth century, interstate wars have been even more limited and sporadic. If one compares a 
contemporary map of South America with one of the nineteenth century, there are no major 
differences in borders. Certainly, not one political state has ceased to exist in South America as 
consequence of war.161 This “under-conflictual anomaly,” as Buzan and Wæver called it,162 has 
not passed unnoticed to IR scholars. 
 Different theories have been proposed to explain the relative absence of war in South 
America (or Latin America, generally speaking). Echoing Tilly’s theory of state making through 
war making, it has been proposed that limited wars made limited states, and limited states made 
limited war.163  
The theory of hegemonic peace –directly linked to the hegemonic stability theory- has been 
challenged, demonstrating the tenuous relationship between the South American conflicts since 
the end of the First World War and the diplomatic, economic, and military actions of United States 
in the region. The militarized interstate disputes were not successfully managed by the United 
States, even to the point of having increased in the period of U.S. hegemony.164 
 There were non-realist approaches, too. One is democratic peace theory, which in late 
developments established that foreign policy of democracies tends to be more peaceful than 
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State University Press, 2002), cited in Escudé, “Un experimento pacifista…,” 9. 
162 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 307. 
163  Centeno, cited in Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, “Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the 
Contemporary Third World,” International Studies Review 10, 2008, 27-56. 
164 David Mares, Violent Peace. Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001) cited in Mijares, “Unveiling the Offense-Defense Balance in South America,” 4. 
67 
 
autocracies. However, characterizing South American states as liberal democracies proper of 
democratic peace theory can be problematic at best, particularly in twentieth century, when there 
was no shortage of military coups and de facto regimes. Escudé points at “something in the ethical 
and political culture of Latin American concert,” but his argument remains underdeveloped.165 
 Mijares breaks with all these approaches and, in the spirit of Grygiel, suggest to pay 
attention again to geography. Human geography shows the location of the centers of main strategic 
importance of a state and whether there is demographic contiguity through neighboring states. In 
South America, the centers of decision-making, the main military bases, and the core of industrial 
production –targets of greater strategic value- tend to be located on the shores of the continent. 
Mijares observers that the geographical contiguity of some of these objectives leads not to a 
regional security complex but to the “compartmentalization of sub-clusters of security in the form 
of dyads.” Moreover, regarding offense-defense balance in the terms of Jervis, Mijares concludes 
that “there is an advantage for the defense in at least six of the nine neighbors of Brazil.”166 
 Simply, distances are too big and obstacles too great. Some examples: the distance between 
Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro is 1965.6 km, roughly less than the distance between London and 
Sofia (2014.49 km). The distance between Lima and Santiago is 2466.28 km, barely more than 
between London and Athens (2391.82 km). The distance between Lima and Rio de Janeiro is 
3775.39 km, more or less like the distance between London and Yerevan (3614.08 km). 
 Distance and physiological barriers reinforced separation and isolation, and this prevented 
cooperation as much as it prevented major wars. After Independence War, nine countries emerged 
from the three former Spanish viceroyalties. Despite common language, cultural heritage and 
shared national problems, the norm between former Spanish colonies was fragmentation and not 
integration, much less with Brazil included in the picture. Thus, until very recently South American 
states were not able to increase cooperation.167  
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5.3 External balancing 
In this section I will give answer to one of the research questions of this thesis: what are 
the chances of external balancing in South America, i.e. a coalition of South American states? 
 To sum up what has been discussed hitherto, when it comes to assessing incentives for 
joining in a balancing coalition, there are three variables to consider.  
One of them is related to distribution of capabilities or relative power, in a strictly Waltzian 
sense. More powerful states are more likely to engage in balancing than are weaker states. Weak 
states facing a potential hegemon may be so vulnerable that they choose to bandwagon rather than 
balance. Bandwagoning is the strategy for the weak. 
The other two are geographic variables. The first one is relative position or distance. States 
nearer the threat are more likely to engage in balancing than are more distant states. Potential 
hegemons that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far way, since the ability to 
project power declines with distance. The second one is very much related to the first one: the 
presence of a buffer zone, or a natural geographic barrier that gives the defense the advantage over 
the offense. This could be the territory of another state, a large body of water, high mountains, etc. 
Let us see what happens when these three variables are considered in the case of South 
America against a hegemonic Brazil. Hegemony does not equal a constant thrust towards 
expansion or marching into other countries’ capitals. It means that a state is so powerful that it 
dominates all the other states in the system, and for this it counts with a credible military force to 
substantiate its power. This prevents the other states from challenging rules of behavior imposed 
by the hegemon. 
However, let us assume that the worst case scenario is presented: Brazil willing to make 
use of force and conduct an offensive operation, i.e. sending an army into another state’s territory. 
If the analysis of these variables shows that external balancing is not likely even in the face of a 
worst case scenario, then logically it will be much less likely when the threat is less tangible. 
 Table 3 compares South American states by area, population, population below the poverty 
line, GDP and total primary energy consumption. I have tried to obtain the most recent year of 




 Area (km2) Population % Poverty GDP TPEC 
Argentina 2,780,400 43,024,376 30 (2014) 537.7 3,66507 
Bolivia 1,098,581 10,631,486 45 (2014) 33 0,29253 
Brazil 8,515,767 202,656,784 21 (2014) 2,417 12,09546 
Chile 756,102 17,363,894 15 (2009) 258.1 1,41864 
Colombia 1,141,748 46,245,296 33 (2012) 377.7 1,54529 
Ecuador 276,841 15,654,411 26 (2013) 100.9 0,64015 
Guyana 214,969 735,554 35 (2006) 3.097 0,02231 
Paraguay 406,750 6,703,860 35 (2010) 30.88 0,46044 
Peru 1,285,216 30,147,936 26 (2012) 202.6 1,09307 
Suriname 163,820 573,311 70 (2002) 5.210 0,042 
Uruguay 181,034 3,332,972 19 (2010) 57.47 0,16849 
Venezuela 916,445 28,868,486 32 (2011) 381.3 3,3642 
Total 17,737,673 405,938,566  4,404.957 24.80765 
Table 3. South American countries by area, population, poverty, GDP, Total Primary Energy Consumption168 169 
 
 I have chosen “population below the poverty line” as an indicator of wealth distribution 
within each state, so as not to rely merely on GDP. I might as well have chosen GDP per capita or 
GINI index and the results would not differ substantially. 
 Table 4 presents the military balance in South America as of 2013: military expenditures 
by absolute numbers and percentage of GDP; total personnel and land forces; number of heavy 
and light weight tanks, and fighter aircraft. Offensive realism emphasizes land power, therefore I 
have chosen to highlight army personnel and tanks. Aircraft is considered as a support to land 
power, so I have included fighter aircraft as means of example. Sea forces, however, have been 
excluded from this table.170 Let us interpret the data coming from tables 3 and 4. 
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 Budget % GDP Total  
Personnel 
Army Tanks 
(heavy + light) 
Fighters 
Argentina 4,766.703 0.95 75,700 44,000 230 + 166 96 
Bolivia 456.291 1.54 46,300 35,000 0 + 54 34 
Brazil 32,449.492 1.32 337,400 208,300 430 + 84 318 
Chile 6,286.789 2.20 64,200 37,100 318 + 0 80 
Colombia 8,843.216 2.28 268,500 229,200 0 90 
Ecuador 2,057.656 2.36 60,800 49,000 0 + 108 47 
Guyana No data No data 1,100 900 - - 
Paraguay 512.558 1.66 10,690 7,600 6 + 5 6 
Peru 2,329.483 1.05 117,000 76,400 160 + 96 71 
Suriname No data No data 1,840 1,400 - - 
Uruguay 957.301 1.85 24,600 15,900 15 + 39 13 
Venezuela 7,473.391 2.16 97,900 66,000 92 + 112 80 
Table 4. Military Balance in South America (2013)171 
 
Argentina 
 Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly literate population and a diversified 
industrial base. It has suffered recurring economic crises, persistent fiscal and current account 
deficits, high inflation, mounting external debt and capital flight.172 However, in terms of relative 
power or material capabilities, Argentina is second only to Brazil, although the gap between the 
two has grown immense in the last decades. As of 2013, Argentina’s Gross Domestic Product at 
Purchasing Power Parity was US$771 billion. Argentina has the third biggest population, although 
30% of population are below poverty line. Argentina’s active military personnel is 75,700 (44,000 
land forces). However, Argentina stands fifth in the continent in defense budget (US$ 4,766.703 
million, one eighth of Brazil’s budget), behind Colombia, Venezuela and Chile, and last in 
percentage of GDP spent in military expenditure. 
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 The second country in South America by area, one third the size of Brazil, Argentina is 
Brazil’s biggest neighbor. They share a border of 1,263 km. The river Iguazú forms the boundary 
between Argentina’s Misiones Province and the Brazilian state of Paraná, until it empties into the 
Paraná River at the point where the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet (the Triple 
Frontier). The Paraná River separates then Argentina from Paraguay. To the east and south of 
Misiones, the Uruguay River forms the boundary with the Brazilian states of Santa Catarina and 
Rio Grande do Sul, and continues flowing southward, separating Argentina’s Corrientes Province 
and Rio Grande do Sul, and then Entre Ríos Province and Uruguay.  
To be sure, a large scale river-crossing operation is not the optimal way to start an invasion, 
because the water obstacle prevents ground maneuver in the usual way, and it demands more 
detailed planning and technical support than normal tactical operations. However, it is still feasible 
if the plans include the fundamentals of surprise, extensive preparation, flexibility, traffic control, 
organization and speed.173 
 Argentina has therefore the size, population and wealth necessary to enter a balancing 
coalition. Moreover, a coalition would be much convenient in view of the currently extremely low 
military expenditure. It has incentives to balance, because it is a direct neighbor of Brazil, with 
whom it shares a lengthy fluvial border that, even though it presents some obstacles for the 
offensive, does not constitute an impassable natural barrier for a reasonably competent enemy. 
 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Guyana, Suriname 
 Paraguay and Uruguay have been traditionally considered by geopolitical discourse as 
buffer states between Argentina and Brazil. Their GDPs combined (US$ 104 billion) are but one 
seventh of Argentina’s. Their combined population amounts to 10 million inhabitants. Whereas 
Uruguay’s population below poverty line is less than 19%, Paraguay’s poverty rate is 35%. As of 
2013, military personnel of Paraguay was 10,690 (7,600) and Uruguay 24,600 (15,900). Combined 
defense budget amounted to US$ 1,500 million.  
Paraguay and Uruguay rank eighth and eleventh among South American countries by area. 
Paraguay is less than one seventh the size of Argentina. Uruguay is even smaller. Their borders 
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with Brazil are 1,371 km and 1,050 km, respectively. In both cases, these borders do not present 
any major obstacle. In the case of Paraguay, there are the Paraguay and Paraná rivers, and some 
mountain ridges that at their highest point reach 700 meters. The eastern region of Paraguay (that 
is, east of Paraguay River) has spacious plains, broad valleys and lowlands, and about 80% of the 
region lies below 300 meters in elevation. The western region, called Gran Chaco, is a vast and 
flat, almost featureless, plain.  
Uruguay’s border with Brazil is composed, from west to east, of the river Cuareim, a low 
range of hills (no more than 500 m in height) called Cuchilla de Haedo, and then conventional 
lines until the Atlantic Ocean. Uruguayan landscape is largely a gently rolling land, with an 
average elevation of 117 m. 
Despite being direct neighbors of Brazil and lacking natural borders to alter the balance in 
favor of the defense, offensive realism predicts that Paraguay and Uruguay would rather 
bandwagon with Brazil rather than join a coalition against it, for they are rather weak states with 
small capabilities.  
The same reasoning can be applied to the two small states Guyana and Suriname, to the 
north of Brazil. Guyana is slightly bigger than Uruguay, but as regards GDP, population and 
military personnel, both Guyana and Suriname occupy the last positions of the continent and their 
numbers are frankly irrelevant when compared to the rest. 
 
Chile and Ecuador 
 Chile is the seventh South American country by area, less than one fourth the size of 
Argentina, and as of 2013, it was sixth by GDP (US$335 billion), and sixth in terms of population 
(17,363,894). Chile has the smallest rate of population below the poverty line (15%) and it is the 
only South American OECD member; moreover, it is a market-oriented economy with high level 
of foreign trade, reputed for strong financial institutions.174  
Active military personnel is 64,200 (37,100), similar to Ecuador (see below) and a bit less 
than Argentina. Rate of GDP spent in defense budget is 2.20%, one of the highest in the continent, 
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and spends more in absolute terms than its neighbors. As a matter of fact, Chile holds the highest 
expenditure in investment. It is generally considered that Chilean armed forces counts with the 
most modern military technology in the region, particularly regarding tanks and fighter aircraft. 
Despite the thin and long shape of the country, which translates into lack of strategic depth and 
several challenges for communications and logistics, Chilean armed forces are a credible deterrent. 
Their presence in any balancing coalition would be highly esteemed.175  
Ecuador, on the other hand, is the ninth country by area, roughly bigger than half the size 
of Paraguay and, as of 2013, had the seventh biggest GDP (US$ 158 million). Its population almost 
equals the number of Chile (15,654,411) and so does its military personnel: 60,800 (49,000). 
Ecuador has doubled its rate of GDP, and augmented 2.4 times the budget destined for military 
expenditure.176  
Ecuador, while not being an entirely weak state, is among the less powerful in relation to 
the other South American states, and this is one of the reasons why offensive realism would expect 
it to pass the buck rather than joining a balancing coalition against Brazil. The other reason is 
relative position or distance. Ecuador is not a direct neighbor of Brazil. In between the two states 
lie the Loreto Region of Peru and the Amazonas Department of Colombia. Moreover, all that area 
is a scarcely populated buffer zone covered with the thick vegetation of Amazonas rainforest. 
Therefore, Ecuador is likely to feel less vulnerable to invasion and more inclined to pass the buck 
to an endangered state that has a common border with Brazil. 
  The same logic applies to Chile, which despite its size, is a relatively wealthy country with 
a credible military power that would prove a valuable ally in any coalition. However, it is unlikely 
that it would join to balance against Brazil. Not only it is not a direct neighbor, but the territories 
of four states (Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru) serve as a buffer zone between Chile and 
Brazil. Chile is not keen on alliances with anyone, but in any case, it will be more likely to side 
with Brazil against any of its direct neighbors, Peru, Bolivia, or Argentina, than the other way 
around. In fact, as mentioned in chapter 3, traditionally there was a checkboard pattern of crossed 
informal alliances: Argentina-Peru, Chile-Brazil, and Chile-Ecuador. The border disputes between 
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Argentina and Chile have been settled, but controversies with Bolivia and Peru remain. Chile has 
more reasons to be concerned about Bolivia and Peru than about Brazilian hegemony. 
 
Peru, Colombia and Venezuela 
 Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela complete the South American top five when it comes to 
GDP and population. As of 2013, Colombia had a GDP of US$ 527 billion and is more populated 
than Argentina. 33% of population is below poverty line. Military personnel of Colombia is 
268,500 (229,200), due to the ongoing conflict with the FARC. The ratio between GDP and 
defense budget is 2.28%, the highest in South America, and the second in absolute terms 
(US$ 8,843 million), yet it amounts only to one fourth of Brazil’s.  
Peru is the third South American country by area, roughly bigger than half the size of 
Argentina. In 2013 it had a GDP of US$ 344 billion, and 26% of population were below poverty 
line. Military personnel is 117,000 (76,400), and military expenditure is more or less one third of 
Colombia’s. The area of Venezuela is barely smaller than Bolivia’s. Its GDP was US$ 407 billion 
in 2013. Its population is almost equal to Peru, but percentage below poverty line is 32%. The 
military personnel is 97,900 (66,000). Military expenditures in Venezuela are almost as high as in 
Colombia. 
 The three countries share borders with Brazil and these are located in the Amazon jungle. 
Peruvian border is 2,659 km long, Venezuelan 2,137 km and Colombian 1,790 km. The Amazon 
jungle, or Amazonia, is sparsely populated, with scattered settlements inland. Most of the 
population lives in a few larger cities: Manaus in Brazil, and Iquitos in Peru, which is only 
accessible by airplane or boat. The principal path of transportation for local people and produce is 
the Amazon River itself. Infrastructure is also scarce. The Trans-Amazonian highway is 
underdeveloped and unpaved, and the Trans-Amazonian Railway is only a project. 
 The key argument I propose here is that Amazonia serves as an immense buffer zone 
between Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela, on one side, and Brazil on the other. The huge distance 
and the scarce transportation infrastructure, plus the difficulty inherent in moving throughout a 
thick jungle, alters the offense-defense balance in favor of defense. Therefore, Peru, Colombia and 
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Venezuela, even though they have the size and potential to join a coalition (perhaps a little less in 
the case of Peru), feel relatively less threatened by a Brazilian expansionist drive.  
It is true that Brazil is interested in developing infrastructure and logistics in Amazonia. It 
is widely known that Brazil regards Amazonia as a strategic region and it has the imperative to 
protect it. Brazil might change the game here with initiatives such as IIRSA, but it will still take 
some time to make a significant progress.  
Besides, even if Brazil develops its side of the Amazonia, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela 
still have a huge area of underdeveloped jungle region. Providing they have the incentives to build 
infrastructure there, it would still take considerable time, more than in the case of Brazil, for they 
have fewer resources. Moreover, in the case that Brazil was able to send an expeditionary force 
throughout Amazonia, it would still have to cross the Andes to penetrate into the strategic centers 
of Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela.  
My reasoning is that as it stands, Amazonia is analogous either to the situation in Central 
Asia described by Mackinder before the era of transcontinental railways (i.e. a vast space of 
difficult access and mobility), or to the presence of a large body of water. In any case, projection 
of land power is fundamentally hindered in the current situation. 
 
Bolivia 
 At first sight, the case of Bolivia lies halfway between those of Peru and Paraguay. Bolivia 
is a direct neighbor of Brazil, and in fact it has the longest border: 3,403 km. It is the fifth biggest 
South American state by area, slightly smaller than Colombia. However it is a rather poor country, 
even by South American standards. Bolivia had as of 2013 a GDP of US$ 59 billion, slightly bigger 
than those of Uruguay and Paraguay, and 45% of population live below poverty line. Its military 
personnel is 46,300 (35,000) but its military expenditure is one of the lowest in the continent 
(US$ 456 million), only above Guyana and Suriname. The departments of Pando and Beni in the 
north are the least populous and the most isolated, and most of its population lives in poverty.  
 Lack of resources and ineffective occupation of the territory make the case of Bolivia more 
similar to those of Paraguay and Uruguay. Despite being considerably bigger than the other two 
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buffer states, it is a rather weak country. Offensive realism would expect Bolivia to bandwagon 
with Brazil rather than confront it. 
 
Conclusion on external balancing 
  The possibility of external balancing against an assertive and expansionist Brazil is very 
unlikely. When the variables of relative capabilities, relative distance, and offense-defense balance 
due to buffer zones are considered, it turns out that only Argentina would have both the capacity 
and the incentives to stand against the potential hegemon. 
 Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Guyana and Suriname, are all direct neighbors of Brazil and 
have reason to feel threatened. However, they are too small and weak. Therefore, they are more 
likely to bandwagon than to balance. Ecuador is also small and rather weak, but apart from that, 
the territories of Peru and Colombia provide Ecuador with a buffer zone. Therefore Ecuador is 
more likely to pass the buck to more powerful states who share a border with Brazil.  
Chile is a strong country with a credible military force but it is not a direct neighbor of 
Brazil. In principle, it would be more inclined to pass the buck, like Ecuador. Moreover, it has 
more reasons to be concerned about Bolivia and Peru, direct neighbors with whom it has ongoing 
border disputes, than with Brazil, who is a distant threat. 
Colombia and Venezuela are strong countries in the context of South America, in many 
respects only below Argentina and Brazil. Peru is not as strong as the other two but I would not 
characterize it as weak as Paraguay or Bolivia. The three countries have something in common, 
though: the Amazon Jungle provides them with a huge buffer zone. Furthermore, their population 
centers and resources are located behind the barrier of the Andes, which do not constitute the 
border with Brazil, but are located deep within their territories.  
The development of trans-Amazonian logistics and transportation could change the game 
regarding this region, but for the moment, ceteris paribus, the combined effect of Amazonia and 
the Andes reduces the threat against a Brazilian advance. 
There are two final comments I would like to make for this chapter. 
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Firstly, all that has been said hitherto is considered in the case of a worst case scenario in 
which Brazil show clear signs of an expansionist or aggressive campaign. Logically, if the threat 
was less tangible, the chances to form a balancing coalition would reduce even more. 
  Secondly, from the same geopolitical analysis of this chapter it can be concluded that, 
ceteris paribus, there is but one logical vector of expansion for Brazil, if it ever decided to launch 
an aggressive military campaign. That is in the south east of Brazil, from Santa Catalina and Rio 
Grande do Sul and towards the La Plata basin, where there are no major natural barriers in the 
form of mountain ranges or a vast area of thick rainforest. 
 Argentinean foreign policy decision-makers would be well advised to consider the 
possibility that if Brazil ever decides, for any reason, to launch an offensive campaign towards the 
eastern provinces of Mesopotamia, Argentina will probably have no choice but to face the threat 
by its own means, without aid from an extra-regional balancer such as the USA or from an external 
coalition of South American states. 




6. Neoclassical realism and Argentinean internal balancing 
 
6.1 Why neoclassical realism 
Gideon Rose, who originated the term “neoclassical realism,” sees offensive realism, 
defensive realism and neoclassical realism as competing theories of foreign policy.177 In this thesis, 
though, I will follow a conception of neorealism and neoclassical realism as complementary.  
Neorealists acknowledge that they do not intend to explain everything that happens in 
world politics. Waltz warns against mistaking a theory of international politics for a theory of 
foreign policy.178 Mearsheimer, on his part, comments that “offensive realism does not answer 
every question that arises in world politics, because there will be cases in which the theory is 
consistent with several possible outcomes. When this occurs, other theories have to be brought in 
to provide more precise explanations.”179 
Therefore, neorealism and neoclassical realism differ on the phenomena each seeks to 
explain, or the dependent variable. Whereas neorealism seeks to explain international outcomes, 
such as the likelihood of major war, the prospects for international cooperation, aggregate alliance 
patterns among states, arms races and crisis bargaining, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the 
foreign policy strategies of individual states, i.e. why different states or even the same state at 
different times pursues particular strategies in the international arena. 180  
 Waltz himself distinguishes between a theory of international politics and a theory of 
foreign policy. A theory of international politics, he says, “does not tell us why state X made a 
certain move last Tuesday. A theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about 
matters at a different level of generality”.181 
 Neoclassical realist theories are theories of foreign policy, which can be applied to great 
powers but also to regional and small powers, developing countries, or divided, warring, or failed 
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states.182 These theories explain when states cannot adapt properly to systemic constraints and 
what the consequences are. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and 
intervening unit-level variables.  
The characterization of intervening variables differs according to the author. Rose speaks 
of “elite’s capacities”,183 Taliaferro of “state power”,184 and Christensen of “national political 
power”.185 The three names refer to the idea that there is variance across states in the capacity of 
their decision makers to mobilize their resources for defense, even when confronted with the same 
threat.186 
Hence, neorealism and neoclassical realism should not be considered opponents. At most, 
they represent a division of labor.187   
 
6.2 The state and domestic actors 
Neoclassical realism conceives states as basically a national security executive, comprised 
of the head of government and the ministers and officials charged with making foreign security 
policy. Many times the state has to bargain with domestic actors in order to extract resources and 
implement policies. These actors include the legislature, political parties, economic sectors, and 
the public opinion.188 
In this context, states assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a 
result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations. In other words, complex 
domestic political processes act as transmission belts that channel, mediate, and direct or redirect 
policy outputs in response to external forces, such as changes in relative power.189  
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In order to understand the implications of a neoclassical realist approach to the enterprise 
of internal balancing in Argentina, the first step is thus to identify the actors involved. 
 Argentina is a federal republic with a presidential system of government, like the United 
States and the majority of South American states.190 The Executive power is exercised by the 
president, who is both head of government and head of state. Legislative power is vested in both 
the Executive and the National Congress. There is also an independent Judiciary.191 
The President as head of government, thus, is the head of the national security executive. 
The President appoints and removes ambassadors, is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, 
provides for the military posts and is in charge of the organization and distribution of the Armed 
Forces, etc. As regards the national foreign and security policies, the President is assisted by the 
Minister of Foreign Relations.192 
 Then there are the domestic actors. In the first place there is the National Congress, 
composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Congress is in charge of setting taxes 
and customs, and is entitled to approve or reject every international treaty that Argentina signs 
with other states or international organizations. Declarations of war and the signing of peace, as 
well as the mobilization of the national troops, within or without the Argentine territory, must be 
allowed by the Congress.193 
 In practice though, Argentina is a hyper-presidential system, and the constitutional 
amendment of 1994, designed to limit the powers of the president, has not been successful at that. 
The President has authority to issue decrees with legal force in a wider range of situations than in 
the United States, for example. The issuance of so-called “necessity and urgency decrees” often 
occurs simultaneously with the invocation of formal emergency powers. Argentine Presidents have 
many times relied on these decrees to advance their agendas, including budgetary increases.194 
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From 1930 to 1982, the Argentinean military has conducted six coups d’état (1930, 1943, 
1956, 1962, 1966, 1976), constituting itself as a very important veto player in national politics. 
However, the exit of the military junta in 1983 after Malvinas War meant the end of a period of 
military de facto regimes. Unlike in Chile and Brazil, where military regimes could negotiate their 
exit and maintain positions of power in the structure of the state, in Argentina the military internal 
power collapsed completely and so the military corporation found itself unable to lobby for 
resources.195  
Compulsory military service was dismantled, along with the arms industry and an 
intermediate range ballistic missile project. Argentina adhered to Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The military 
budget was reduced to the minimum necessary to cover daily expenditures, and the arms imports 
decreased almost to zero.196 
A more important veto player is the Peronist movement which usually has a decisive 
presence in the legislature and most of province governors. Peronism has ruled Argentina for most 
of the time since 1983. Most of trade union leaders are also affiliated to the movement. The 
acquiescence of Peronism is a key element to the stability of the government. In fact, since 1983, 
only Peronists presidencies completed its mandate. The two non-Peronist presidents (Alfonsín 
1983-1989, De La Rúa, 1999-2001) had to resign before due time. 
Peronism is better characterized as a movement rather than a party. Even though it has left 
and right wings within itself, its ideology is originally a blend of nationalism and laborism. Peronist 
presidents, however, have enacted radically opposed policies and the partisans have 
accommodated according to the occasion.197 Examples abound. For instance, Peronist legislators 
voted for privatizing Argentinean oil company YPF. Ten years later they enthusiastically voted for 
the state to rebuy it and run it again, seemingly disregarding all the records and archives. In any 
case, whoever is in charge of the national security executive will need to deal with Peronism. 
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When it comes to societal or economic elites, it is noteworthy that the major economic 
partner of Argentina is Brazil, representing 20% of exports and 22% of imports. Argentina’s top 
exports are soybean meal, delivery trucks, soybeans, con, and soybean oil. Its top imports are 
petroleum gas, refined petroleum, cars, vehicle parts and telephones.198  
Liberal theories (complex interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism) establish a 
causal connection between economic interdependence and a greater likelihood of peace. Therefore 
they cannot explain how states can simultaneously view and treat one another both as valued 
trading partners and security threats. 
Jennifer Sterling-Folker presents a neoclassical realist answer: states compete with one 
another over the allocation of scarce resources at the international level, but at the same time within 
each state different groups compete with one another over the allocation of resources. International 
competition and intra-national competition affect each other and cannot be isolated. That is why 
China and United States see themselves as both partners and competitors, and why security 
tensions between China and Taiwan remain high despite increasing economic ties and clear power 
asymmetries.199 
The same case can be made about Argentina’s relations with Brazil. Brazil is Argentina’s 
major economic partner and at the same time, under certain circumstances, can represent a security 
threat. Therefore it is important to understand threat assessment. A timely and efficient balancing 
will be conditional on a consensus on threat assessment by state and the societal elites.200  This is 
directly related to the next section. 
 
6.3 Internal balancing 
“Under-balancing”  
One of the research questions of neoclassical realism is why some states fail to balance. 
According to Schweller, “under-balancing” occurs “when the state does not balance or does so 
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inefficiently in response to a dangerous and unappeasable aggressor. When the state under-
balances, it either misperceives the intentions of the rising power as more benign than they in fact 
are or, if it correctly perceives the threat, does not adopt prudent policies to protect itself for reasons 
of domestic politics.”201 
Schweller proposes two domestic-level reasons for under-reaction to structural incentives: 
1) actors’ preferences, which may be more influenced by domestic than international concerns, do 
not create incentives to adopt a balancing policy; 2) potential domestic political risks and costs of 
balancing are too high. Schweller concludes by suggesting four unit-level variables to explain 
variation across space and time in state responses to threats: 1) elite consensus; 2) government or 
regime vulnerability; 3) social cohesion; 4) elite cohesion.202 
The closer the policymaking process and actual state-society relations approximate a 
unitary actor, the more accurate realism’s predictions. Conversely, when states are divided at the 
elite and societal levels, they are less likely to behave in accordance with balance of power 
predictions. Leaders of incoherent states are less willing and able to undertake high political and 
policy risks to balance than are leaders of coherent states.203 
Therefore, Argentina will be able to enact an internal balancing policy as long as its 
national security executive can maintain a coalition with political and economic or societal elites. 
The cooperation of the Peronist movement is important to guarantee regime stability.  
Steven E. Lobell argues that states do not only respond to aggregate shifts in the 
international distribution of power, but also to shifts in specific components of other states’ 
material capabilities.204 The export-oriented sector will most likely have a material interest in 
different types of economic foreign policies and will focus on certain components of Brazilian 
material capabilities. The security sector will have its own particular focus on them. The inputs of 
these sectors will have an impact on threat assessment. 
Assuming that Argentina presents a coherent shape, what strategies will implement to 
balance internally?  
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Another research question of neoclassical realism is why and how states choose among 
different types of balancing strategies: emulation, innovation, or the continuation of existing 
strategies. Emulation is the conscious, purposeful imitation, in full or in part, by one state of any 
institution, technology, or governing practice of another state. Innovation is the conscious, 
purposeful effort to offset the perceived relative power advantage of another state by the creation 
of entirely new institutions, technologies, or governing practices.205 
Taliaferro proposes two variables when it comes to choosing between emulation and 
innovation: high or low level of external threat, and high or low extraction and mobilization 
capacity (see Table 2). Extraction and mobilization capacity are the key intervening variables of 
neoclassical realism. According to Taliaferro, states can try to increase them, and consequently 
their ability to pursue emulation or innovation, by purveying nationalist or statist ideologies. A 
lack of nationalist sentiment or an anti-statist ideology can limit the state’s ability to emulate or 
innovate.206 
In Argentina, nationalism has been always present and takes different forms. Historian 
Michael Goebel distinguishes a territorial “Malvinist” nationalism, and a partisan, revisionist 
nationalism, which is sort of an internal historiographic tendency that opposes a liberal historic 
narrative.207 The territorial nationalism has been entrenched by decades of public education.208 
Others believe that despite widespread profusion of patriotic symbols (in particular during football 
World Cups and other major sports events), Argentineans are not as united as it seems.209 
Whereas the exact degree of nationalism in Argentina may be arguable, there can be little 
doubt about the hegemony of statist ideology. According to a national survey by Ibarómetro, 8 out 
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of 10 Argentineans believe the state should be the main responsible for people’s welfare.210 As of 
2014, 13 million Argentineans had state incomes and half the adult population depended on 
national budget. Between 2000 and 2012, the state grew 60% and represented 42.5% of the 
economy. Currently, Argentina has the biggest tax pressure in its history and leads the ranking of 
countries with the highest tax rates in the world.211  
External threats 
Extraction and mobilization capacity 
High Low 
High Emulation of military, governing 
and technological practices of the 
system’s most successful states, at 
least in the short run 
Greater difficulty in pursuing 
emulation, at least in the short run 
Low Innovation to enhance long-term 
security and power 
Less likely to pursue emulation or 
innovation 
Table 5. Emulation or innovation212 
 
Consequently, there are reasons to locate Argentina on the “High extraction and 
mobilization capacity” column of Table 2. When it comes to innovation or emulation, the former 
is more costly and time consuming than emulation. The question is basically how soon Argentina 
will begin to rebuild its armed forces. At the moment, the situation is dramatic. There is the opinion 
that Argentina would not be able to withhold an attack from Paraguay for more than 24 hours.213  
Argentina should then start a process of innovation now, before external threats become high. For 
example, in the event that Brazil decides to be more assertive in its role of regional hegemon.  
If Argentina does decide to innovate, there is another reason to begin as soon as possible. 
Military organizations seek to reduce uncertainty, and the best way to do so is to repeat standard 
operating procedures. Innovation in military doctrine increases operational uncertainty. If a war 
comes during the transition and the organization finds itself between doctrines, the ability of 
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commanders to lead combat operations will decline. Military organizations are more inclined to 
innovate when they have failed –suffered a defeat- or when civilians intervene from without.214 
It was already mentioned that in the case of Argentina after the defeat in 1982, the Armed 
Forces did not innovate, but were rather progressively dismantled. The argument of Talmadge 
presented in chapter 4 about how regimes facing significant coup threats are unlikely to adopt 
military organization practices that maximize military capability comes at play here. When it 
comes to military doctrine innovation, the case of “Plan Ejército Argentino 2025” is a good 
example. In 2007, the Argentinean Army proposed the Ministry of Defense a new military doctrine 
based on the concept of “war for the natural resources”. Whatever the merits of that new idea, the 
President Nestor Kirchner rejected it outright, sending the message that initiatives such as these 
by the Army were not welcomed.215 Under such circumstances, the civilian intervention into 
doctrinal matters is both necessary and essential. 
Offensive realism expects Brazil to make a run for regional hegemony. In chapters 5 and 
6 I argued why offshore balancing and regional balancing are not likely to happen. At this point, 
two future scenarios are possible. If Argentina succeeds at internal balancing, then Brazilian 
hegemony can be prevented, and perhaps there is even a possibility to restore something close to 
bipolarity in the region. Success will depend on the ability of the national security executive to 
form a coalition with political, societal and economical elites to assess a threat and define a 
balancing strategy. If innovation is the strategy of choice, then the sooner it starts the better. 
However, under-balancing may occur too. In that case, Brazil will be within reach of regional 
hegemony. 
Finally, Argentina should be careful in implementing its internal balancing strategy. There 
is the risk of self-fulfilled prophecy. This could happen if imprudent aggressive rhetoric or an 
overtly offensive doctrine comes into light, causing Brazil to launch a preventive war. 
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7. Wild card: nuclear weapons 
 
Some states in the international system have attained and maintained nuclear weapons: the 
five permanent members of United Nations Security Council, India, Pakistan, and presumably 
Israel. Some others have attained nuclear weapons but gave them up (Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine and South Africa). Others are still trying to attain them, others never tried (nuclear 
abstinence) and some states tried but gave up. This last category is labelled “nuclear reversal” and 
includes Argentina and Brazil.216 
The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco banned nuclear weapons in Latin America. Argentina, 
despite signing the treaty, did not pursue ratification domestically until 1994. The military coup in 
Brazil in 1964 brought to power a nationalist military regime that was unenthusiastic for the 
nuclear weapons free zone project. Both Argentina and Brazil were opposed to any infringements 
on their sovereignty. Their opposition to the global non-proliferation regime was explicit. With 
the return to democracy in both countries, the nuclear programs suffered from their association 
with the discredited military regimes, their high cost and the international condemnation.217 
Argentina and Brazil joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and 1998. 
However, Argentina and Brazil still possess civilian nuclear technology. Argentina exports 
nuclear reactors. Brazil is developing a nuclear submarine. In 2008, both countries signed an 
agreement for the establishment of a binational plant to enrich uranium with commercial 
purpose.218  
Offensive realism expects great powers to seek nuclear superiority over its rivals. The 
balance of land power would be of minor importance in a world dominated by a nuclear hegemon, 
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and probably the same is true in a region. It is difficult to achieve and maintain, though, because 
rival states will try to develop their own nuclear retaliatory force.219 
Some authors believe that Brazil, which will possess an indigenously developed nuclear 
submarine operational by 2017, is already close to building the bomb. After all, Brazil sees itself 
as a natural candidate for permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. All 
current permanent members have nuclear weapons.220  
On the other hand, Brazil’s constitution bans the development of nuclear weapons. There 
is also the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, created 
in 1991, a binational safeguards agency to verify the peaceful use of nuclear materials. In 2015, its 
inspectors conducted 328 inspections in nuclear facilities of both countries.221 
The abandonment of Treaty of Tlatelolco and Non-Proliferation Treaty by Brazil or 
Argentina is a wild card or black swan event, i.e. an event of high impact, but a low probability, 
meaning that it is unlikely, but not impossible. The impact of such an incident can change whole 
systems and trends, and therefore contains a strong element of strategic surprise. Wild cards 
stimulate strategic thinking and contribute to flexibility and agility in the case such surprise 
eventually occur.222 Therefore, they should not be disregarded. 
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For the last thirty years, Argentinean Armed Forces have followed a path of decay and 
abandonment. The defeat of the military regime in the 1982 war discredited them so they were no 
longer able to lobby for resources. As a consequence, military budget is the lowest in the region. 
Some authors argue it is time to dismantle them completely once and for all, and explain that due 
to democratization there is no more space for conflict hypothesis or “balance of power thinking” 
in the region.223 Offensive realism and scenario methodology provide an opposite argument. 
 Brazil has grown into a potential regional hegemon in South America. According to 
offensive realism, there is no such a thing as an innocent rise in capabilities. The more capabilities 
one state acquires, the more power it will like to exert. This rise in capabilities might stop out of 
reasons unrelated to offensive realism, in which case Brazilian rise stops (Scenario 1). However, 
the megatrends that sustain it are most likely to continue in the future. 
In terms of scenario methodology, it could be said that there are 1) driving forces: 
distribution of power and material capabilities sustained by megatrends in population and wealth; 
2) critical uncertainties: the role of United States as an offshore balancer; 3) contextual 
conditions: geographical variables such as relative distance or position, and buffer zones; 4) wild 
cards: Brazil and/or Argentina resume nuclear projects successfully. 
Scenario methodology allows us then to build three more possible future scenarios for 
South America, according to the premises of offensive realism. In the second scenario, Brazilian 
hegemony is prevented by either offshore balancing by the United States, or external balancing 
by a coalition of South American states. In the third scenario, it is Argentina that, by means of 
internal balancing, is able to slow down the continental tendency to unipolarity and prevent 
Brazilian hegemony. 
In a fourth scenario, balancing fails altogether and Brazil obtains regional hegemony. 
This means uncontested dictate of behavior rules, supported by a credible military capability. In 
the worst case, it means an aggressive campaign of expansion and conquest. 
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The research question of this thesis was: From the point of view of Argentinean decision-
makers, what are the options in order to check an eventual Brazilian attempt at regional hegemony? 
In other words, the question is about the likeliness of the three scenarios presented above. 
Therefore, it can be subdivided as follows: Firstly, should Argentina rely on extra regional 
balancing conducted by the United States? If the answer is in the negative, what are the chances 
of external balancing in South America, i.e. a coalition of South American states? Finally, if both 
extra regional and external balancing fail, and Argentina must recur to internal balancing, what 
will be the challenges and choices of Argentinean decision makers? 
In chapter 4, I have argued against reliance on offshore balancing by the United States. 
Brazil can take advantage of a window of opportunity, whereby the United States is not able to 
react properly to a Brazilian aggression in South America. Furthermore, the consequences of an 
extra regional intervention are hard to predict and could be unpleasant for the third states involved, 
which would do better to try balancing themselves. 
In chapter 5, I have found, based on distribution of power, relative position or distance, and 
the significance of Amazonia as a buffer zone, that external balancing is very unlikely. Argentina 
is the only country with the potential will and capabilities to balance against Brazil. The other 
states are either more likely to bandwagon (those too small and weak) or pass the buck (those 
feeling less threatened). 
In chapter 6, I have recurred to neoclassical realism in order to understand the main 
challenges and choices when it comes to internal balancing. A consensus between the national 
security executive and domestic actors will be of the essence for a proper threat assessment. 
Leaders of an incoherent state will also be less willing and able to undertake high political and 
policy risks to balance. The choices of strategy are dependent on level of external threat and state 
power, defined as the ability to extract and mobilize resources. At the same time, state power is 
dependent on nationalism and statist ideology. In the case of Argentina, the result is the possibility 
to choose innovation as long as the threat level remains low. Innovation should start as soon as 
possible, though, lest the military organization gets caught while changing doctrines. 
Lastly, in chapter 7, it was mentioned that the obtainment of nuclear weapons, however 




The future does not need to be as ominous as it looks in this thesis. After all, Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism is not an uncontested theory. In this sense, one last stage of scenario methodology 
would be to reevaluate offensive realism in light of the generated scenarios. Additionally, in the 
final section of chapter 4, I have mentioned some limitations to Brazil’s rise. The neoclassical 
realist analysis I have made in chapter 7 is valid for Brazil as well: Brazil also needs to stand as a 
coherent state in order to act as neorealism would expect it.  
Notwithstanding all the aforementioned, it is a bold statement to conclude that Argentina 
can spare defense forces and a security policy. If the majority of Argentineans prefer to think that 
they live in a security-abundant environment, with no conflict at all in the horizon, it might do no 
harm, as long as those in charge of national security and foreign policy play its role properly. Their 
role sometimes involves going beyond politically correct thinking. In an international system 
where realism is the paradigm, a state must provide its own security, lest it becomes some other 






Does Argentina still need to maintain its armed forces and a security policy? After the defeat in 
the 1982 War and the return to democracy from a military de facto regime, Argentinean Armed 
Forces lost prestige and their budget is now the lowest in the region. Many authors are of the view 
that they should be dismantled once and for all, for the era of conflict hypothesis and balance of 
power in South America is gone. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a counterargument. 
Scenario methodology allows taking Mearsheimer’s offensive realism as a premise for thinking 
possible futures in South America. Brazil has grown into a candidate for regional hegemony, 
defined as the capacity to impose the rule of behavior to the other states, sustained by a credible 
use of force. In this context, what are the options Argentinean decision-makers have in order to 
check an eventual Brazilian hegemony? Can they rely that the United States will intervene as an 
offshore balancer? What are the chances of external balancing, i.e. a coalition of South American 
states against Brazil? What are their main challenges and options in terms of internal balancing? 
Whether a hegemonic scenario is more likely or not will depend on the answer to those questions. 
The thesis also recurs to geopolitical thinking and neoclassical realism to complement offensive 
realism when necessary. The findings will have implications for both offensive realism and 
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